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Beyond Incentives:  Making Corporate 
Whistleblowing Moral in the New Era of Dodd-Frank 
Act “Bounty Hunting” 
MATT A. VEGA 
If you can imagine Wall Street as the American Old West and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) as the local sheriff, then the SEC’s new bounty program is 
the equivalent of nailing up reward signs all over town that read: “Wanted: Dead or 
Alive.”  The agency is looking for information regarding publicly traded companies, 
financial services institutions, and other covered entities who may have violated U.S. 
securities laws, and it is willing, more than ever, to pay a premium for the information.  
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Act that, among 
other things, amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by adding Section 21F 
“Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection.”  This obscure and little debated 
section offers whistleblowers multi-million dollar “bounties” for reporting suspected 
securities law violations directly to the SEC.  Under the program, which went into effect 
last year, the SEC is required to pay as a bounty to whistleblowers who voluntarily provide 
the agency with “original information” an amount equal to 10% to 30% of any monetary 
sanctions exceeding $1 million dollars.  When the average SEC settlement is over $18.3 
million dollars, whistleblowers can expect the average bounty to be well in the range of $2 
million to $5 million dollars.  
This new program is fundamentally flawed because it attempts to combat corporate 
opportunism by encouraging employee opportunism.  To solve systemic problems like 
securities fraud and foreign bribery, the SEC needs to look beyond financial incentives.  It 
needs to take a step back and consider the basic moral principles of mutual self-interest and 
subsidiarity. These normative arguments were sorely missing in the debates leading up to 
the final rules implementing the bounty program.  These principles make clear that what is 
missing from Congress’s latest effort is mandatory internal reporting.   
This Article endorses the Whistleblower Improvement Act of 2011, H.R. 2483, which 
was introduced by Congressman Michael Grimm in the first session of the 112th Congress 
and would require internal reporting as a condition for money benefits under the SEC’s 
new bounty program.  This amendment is needed not just to make corporate compliance 
programs work in the new era of SEC bounty hunting, but to make whistleblowing morally 
upright. 
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Beyond Incentives:  Making Corporate 
Whistleblowing Moral in the New Era of Dodd-Frank 
Act “Bounty Hunting” 
MATT A. VEGA

 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of the whistleblower as an institution is one of the most 
significant developments in corporate governance in the last fifty years.  
Despite the importance of this development, the role of the whistleblower 
in corporate compliance has received relatively little scholarly attention.
1
  
Most of the existing scholarship concerning whistleblowers has focused on 
analyzing the unwillingness or incapacity of employees to blow the 
whistle,
2
 and these arguments are often overstated and lack empirical 
validation.  In addition, these arguments usually gloss over the deep 
tension in our society’s understanding of whistleblowing by emphasizing 
that informants have provided some assistance in law enforcement efforts 
that benefit society and that the end justifies the means.  This debate over 
when or, better yet, how to get employees to blow the whistle should not 
trump the more fundamental analysis of the whistleblower institution itself 
as a moral enterprise.  Our failure to expand the whistleblower inquiry 
beyond prudential concerns is shortsighted and is leading to perverse 
consequences,
3
 such as the new whistleblower bounty program of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or the “Commission”) 
mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
                                                                                                                          
 Associate Professor of Law, Thomas Goode Jones School of Law, Faulkner University.  J.D., 
1993, Yale Law School.  Formerly in-house counsel for Federal Express Corporation, where the author 
was responsible for various aspects of the company’s regulatory compliance programs.  A special 
thanks to Associate Dean Tim Chinaris for his support in obtaining a research grant to make this Article 
possible, to professors Michael J. DeBoer, Layne Keele, Adam J. MacLeod, and Robert L. McFarland 
for their helpful insights, and to my research assistants Kaleb Steinhauer and Melissa Grimm-Maddox 
for their able help. 
1 Throughout this Article, I use the terms “corporate governance” and “corporate compliance” 
interchangeably. 
2 See Jayne W. Barnard, Evolutionary Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
71 U. PITT. L. REV. 403, 410 (2010) (summarizing arguments that suggest a bounty program is 
necessary to encourage whistleblowing). 
3 See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Elec., 808 F. Supp. 580, 584 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (criticizing the 
Department of Justice for the perverse way it treats its informants as adversaries rather than allies). 
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Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”).4  The Dodd-Frank Act, among other 
things, amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934  (“Exchange Act”) 
by adding Section 21F entitled “Securities Whistleblower Incentives and 
Protection” to significantly expand the SEC’s existing whistleblower 
bounty program.
5
 
This Article argues that the most significant problem with the SEC’s 
new bounty program is that it does not mandate that corporate 
whistleblowers report violations internally before going to the SEC in 
order to qualify for the award.  Under the bounty program, corporate 
whistleblowers are confronted with the Hobson’s choice of either reporting 
directly to the SEC and maximizing their prospects for a financial award, 
or giving the corporation the opportunity to do the right thing and risk 
getting nothing.  Although the final rules add certain incentives intended to 
encourage employees to utilize their company’s internal compliance 
programs, the provisions do not go far enough because whistleblowers are 
not required to use a company’s internal reporting system.  Instead, the 
SEC assumes the employee is in the best position to decide whether to 
cooperate with internal compliance efforts.  The agency further assumes 
that the corporation will not do the right thing, even if prompted by internal 
members. 
Part II of this Article explores the changing role and understandings of 
whistleblowers.  It describes the tension between the two competing views 
of whistleblowers as rats and heroes.  Modern regulatory attempts to 
accommodate both views of whistleblowing have left the whistleblower 
laws increasingly incoherent.  Essentially, regulators have opted to avoid 
the fundamental moral questions altogether and have chosen instead to 
treat whistleblowing as a mere instrumentality or tool for prosecutors to 
                                                                                                                          
4 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 41 U.S.C.).  
Passed by the House on December 11, 2009, and passed with amendments by the Senate on May 20, 
2010, the Dodd-Frank Act constitutes “a sweeping overhaul of the financial regulatory system.”  Press 
Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President on 21st Century Financial 
Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009),  http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-the-
President-on-Regulatory-Reform/.  While many of its provisions related primarily to financial 
institutions, the Act also required the creation of a number of new rules for corporate governance 
affecting public companies in the United States, such as: “say-on-pay” and “say-on-severance” 
provisions permitting non-binding shareholder votes on executives’ compensation and golden 
parachutes every three years; the independence of compensation committees; certain prohibitions and 
reporting requirements for financial institutions regarding compensation structures; guidance regarding 
auditing, attestation, and related professional practice standards for brokers and dealers; and 
clarification that any accounting firm preparing an audit report for an issuer that is a non-accelerated 
filer will not be required to attest to, and report on, the internal control assessment made by the issuer’s 
management.  See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act §§ 721, 723, 733, 735, 951–53, 955, 982, 989G, 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 1a, 2, 7, 7b-3 (2010), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n, 78n-1, 7201, 7262 (2010) (providing compliance, reporting, 
and auditing requirements for publicly traded companies promulgated under the Dodd-Frank Act). 
5 Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2010).   
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gather useful information.  This strictly pragmatic view of whistleblowing 
is particularly evident in the SEC’s new whistleblower bounty program, 
which appeals without apology to an informant’s greed and shows little 
regard for an employee’s duty to report potential compliance problems 
internally before going to the SEC.   
Part III of this Article briefly describes the Dodd-Frank Act’s new 
Section 21F whistleblower bounty program and the SEC’s final rules 
implementing the program that went into effect on August 12, 2011.
6
  This 
program offers whistleblowers more protection from retaliation, as well as 
monetary bounties for reporting suspected securities law violations directly 
to the SEC.
7
  Under the program, the SEC is required to pay a bounty to 
whistleblowers who voluntarily provide the SEC with “original 
information” about a potential securities law violation that leads to a 
successful SEC or “related” enforcement action and results in monetary 
sanctions of sufficient size.
8
  
Part IV of this Article explores the consequences of treating 
whistleblowing as a mere instrumentality.  The bounty program turns the 
very concept of a “whistleblower” on its head and hinders internal efforts 
to promote a strong culture of ethical corporate compliance.  It discourages 
“real” whistleblowing by encouraging employees to remain silent until a 
possible violation reaches the optimum point to present to the SEC a worst 
case scenario and collect their reward.  In addition, it may actually increase 
retaliation against whistleblowers by creating intrafirm adversarialism 
where none previously existed.  In so doing, the bounty program may 
ultimately undermine the moral legitimacy of the whistleblowing 
enterprise altogether. 
Drawing mostly from perfectionist theories of jurisprudence, Part V 
articulates a unifying theory of the role of whistleblowers.  The 
whistleblowing institution is a moral enterprise, and it should be treated as 
such.  The moral approach to whistleblowing can also overcome problems 
that the mere instrumentality approach to whistleblowing—where the 
whistleblower has a legal right to be uncooperative with his or her 
employer’s compliance efforts—cannot.  Making whistleblowing moral 
reduces transaction costs and enhances performance; therefore, 
corporations have more incentive to value—rather than merely to 
tolerate—whistleblowers.  To be moral, whistleblowing and the laws and 
                                                                                                                          
6 The SEC’s final rules (“SEC Rules”) are currently codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-1 et seq. and 
the whistleblower forms are available at 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.1800 and 249.1801.  The new rules apply 
retroactively to tips provided on or after July 21, 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act’s enactment date.  
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300 (June 13, 2011). 
7 See id. at 34,301 (summarizing the potentially greater rewards and the retaliation protections of 
the proposed rule). 
8 Id. at 34,305. 
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organizational rules promoting whistleblowing must, at a minimum, 
respect two basic ideas:  (1) the common good of mutual self-interest and 
(2) the communitarian principle of subsidiarity.   
The common good of mutual self-interest rests on an understanding 
that corporate laws and regulations shape the corporation as a community, 
and that community matters, especially when it comes to finding a 
legitimate role for whistleblowers in corporate compliance.  In addition, 
the principle of subsidiarity demands that whistleblowers try to resolve a 
potential compliance problem internally at the lower corporate level before 
reporting it externally to government at a higher level.   
Support for these two guiding principles is found in a wide range of 
legal philosophies and theories, including the work of perfectionist 
scholars like Joseph Raz,
9
 new natural law theorist John Finnis,
10
 and 
communitarian virtue ethicist Alasdair MacIntyre.
11
  Additionally, 
empirical research and theory developed in the field of organizational 
behavioral management (“OBM”) over the last couple of decades support 
more consideration of both of these moral factors.
12
 
Together, these two ideas contribute to a unifying theory that helps to 
explain the role of whistleblowers in corporate compliance, and they also 
provide more substantive criteria of judgment to evaluate and critique the 
SEC’s regulations implementing the bounty program.  Mutual self-interest 
aligns whistleblowing specifically (and corporate compliance more 
generally) along a more coherent axis that turns on the common good of 
community.  The principle of subsidiarity has a paradoxical quality that 
helps balance the tension between the ideals of belonging to a corporate 
community and affirming an allegiance to the rule of law.  It avoids the 
collapse of corporate compliance into either the unworkable top-down 
approach of traditional command-and-control measures or the ideological 
abstraction of “pure” self-regulation. 
As a practical matter, this unifying theory highlights the need to make 
internal whistleblowing mandatory under the SEC’s new bounty program 
with certain exceptions.  This Article supports a bill introduced to the 
112th Congress to amend the Dodd-Frank Act to require internal reporting 
as a condition for money benefits.  This legislation offers a reasonable 
                                                                                                                          
9 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 206 (1986) (suggesting that being part of a 
society or institution can be intrinsically good). 
10 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 305 (1980) [hereinafter FINNIS, 
NATURAL LAW] (“[T]he common good is the good of individuals, living together and depending upon 
one another in ways that favour the well-being of each.”). 
11 See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 187–88 (2d ed. 
1984) (describing goods internal to human practices which result in excellence over that form of 
activity). 
12 See LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE 247–49 (2011) (discussing the effects of 
economics literature that describes self-interest as rational). 
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approach for addressing both the prudential and normative questions raised 
in this Article.   
II.  THE EVOLVING ROLES OF CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWERS 
This Part describes the evolution of the whistleblower’s role in 
corporate governance.  Although most legal scholarship regarding the role 
of private actors in corporate compliance has focused on lawyers, auditors, 
and institutional shareholders as gatekeepers, rather than whistleblowers,
13
 
over the last several years many fraud and bribery scandals have come to 
light because of whistleblower tips.
14
  Because whistleblowers are now 
playing an increasingly important role in the actual governance of 
corporations, they deserve greater consideration in legal scholarship.
15
  
This Article focuses exclusively on employee whistleblowers.  The 
SEC broadly defines a “whistleblower” as any individual who alone or 
jointly with others provides the Commission with information relating to a 
possible violation of the federal securities laws.
16
  This definition includes 
vendors, service providers, consultants, business competitors and other 
third parties, as well as employees of the offending company.
17
  However, 
when an employee blows the whistle there is tension between his or her 
duties and responsibilities as both a citizen and a corporate citizen that 
does not exist for whistleblowers generally.
18
  This tension revolves around 
                                                                                                                          
13 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of 
Employees: Participatory Management and Natural Law, 43 VILL. L. REV. 741, 742 (1998) (discussing 
programs in which employees participate in corporate compliance decisions); John W. Cioffi, 
Irresistible Forces and Political Obstacles: Securities Litigation Reform and the Structural Regulation 
of Corporate Governance (Comparative Research in Law & Political Econ., Research Paper No. 
7/2006) (describing reforms as restructuring the private sphere to improve corporate compliance), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstractid=902648. 
14 Nina Schichor, Does Sarbanes-Oxley Force Whistleblowers to Sacrifice Their Reputations?  An 
Argument for Granting Whistleblowers Non-Pecuniary Damages, 8 U.C. DAVIS. BUS. L.J. 272, 292 
(2008) (“Our post-Enron society depends on whistleblowers to help regulate private industry.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
15 Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley 
Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 126 (2007) [hereinafter Rapp, 
Beyond Protection] (suggesting that the merits of internal versus external whistleblowing deserves 
further consideration). 
16 See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2 (2012) (“You 
are a whistleblower if, alone or jointly with others, you provide the Commission with information . . . 
and the information relates to a possible violation of Federal securities laws.”). 
17 See id. (providing only that a whistleblower must be an individual, and not a company or 
another entity, and noting that a company or another legal entity is not eligible to be a whistleblower, 
only individuals); see also Marc S. Raspanti & Bryan S. Neft, Dodd-Frank Opens Doors on 
Whistleblower Claims for Securities Law Violations, LAW. J., May 20, 2011 at 4 (arguing that a 
requirement for whistleblowers to report a violation internally prior to submitting an official claim will 
have perverse effects). 
18 For a general discussion of this tension, see Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational 
Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 433, 436–40 (2009). 
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the question of whether an employee should disclose what he or she 
believes to be unethical or illegal to management (internal whistleblowing) 
or to an external authority or the public (external whistleblowing).
19
 For 
purposes of this Article, “corporate whistleblowing” is defined as “the 
disclosure by organization members (former and current) of illegal, 
immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to 
persons or organizations that may be able to effect [sic] action.”20   
Corporate whistleblowers fall into one of three distinct categories:  (1) 
voluntary whistleblowers; (2) mandatory (or compelled) whistleblowers; 
and (3) bounty hunters.
21
  Voluntary whistleblowing refers to the classic 
situation in which an employee chooses to report potential violations of the 
law internally or, if necessary, externally.  On the other hand, compelled 
whistleblowers are required by various laws to monitor the workplace and 
to report potential violations to the proper authorities.  They are often 
referred to by the term “gatekeepers.”  Finally, bounty hunters are 
generally defined as professionals who provide information and other 
services directly to the government for a reward.
22
 
Over the last several decades, corporate whistleblowing has evolved 
from strictly voluntary whistleblowing to both voluntary and mandatory 
whistleblowing.  This change is largely traceable to the passage of modern 
corporate laws and regulations in the late 1970s, and again in the late 
1990s, that express a decidedly moral view of whistleblowers as allies in 
the fight against corporate fraud, bribery, and corruption.  For the most 
part, this development improved the perception of whistleblowing as a 
legitimate “gatekeeper” function in promoting corporate compliance.  
Since then, however, legislators and regulators have been sending mixed 
signals regarding whistleblowing.  Most recently, the SEC has recast 
corporate whistleblowers as “bounty hunters.” This paradigm shift 
undercuts the moral enterprise of whistleblowing.  By becoming a hired 
gun for the SEC, the whistleblower risks losing his or her seat at the table 
                                                                                                                          
19 See James N. Adler & Mark Daniels, Managing the Whistleblowing Employee, 8 LAB. L. 19, 
21–22 n.8 (1992) (further dividing whistleblowers into three subcategories: passive, active, and 
embryonic). 
20 Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Organizational Dissidence: The Case of Whistle-Blowing, 4 
J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 4 (1985). 
21 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. 
L. REV. 323, 330–31 (2007) (describing the three categories of whistleblowers).  But see Elizabeth  
Tippett, The Promise of Compelled Whistleblowing: What the Corporate Governance Provisions 
Sarbanes Oxley Mean for Employment Law, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 12–13 (2007) (further 
distinguishing “compelled whistleblowing” from “mandatory whistleblowing”).  
22 See James Fisher et al., Privatizing Regulation: Whistleblowing and Bounty Hunting in the 
Financial Services Industries, 19 DICK. J. INT’L L. 117, 143 (2000) (concluding that the professional 
bounty hunter model may become essential to enforcement of existing regulations in the financial 
services industry).  Technically, the term “bounty hunters” is a bit of a misnomer when applied to 
corporate whistleblowing since most employees are not professional informants.  Id. at 136–37. 
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of corporate compliance generally.  If left unchanged, the SEC regulations 
that implement the Dodd-Frank Act’s new bounty program threaten to turn 
back the clock on whistleblowers by more than half a century by treating 
whistleblowing as a necessary evil motivated by financial gain rather than 
by moral responsibility. 
A.  Whistleblowers as Rats 
Historically, many policymakers viewed whistleblowers as “rat[s]” and 
“snitches.”23  For example, during the 1998 debate in Congress over 
whether to dismantle the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) whistleblower 
program, Senator Harry Reid of Nevada argued for the end of what he 
called the “Snitch Program” and the “Reward for Rats Program.”24  Even 
regulators who were responsible for protecting whistleblowers treated 
employees who blew the whistle on their employers as morally suspect.
25
  
For example, a former Reagan Administration official in charge of the 
federal whistleblower program reportedly called them “malcontents.”26 
Despite the government’s low opinion of whistleblowers, the incidence 
of whistleblowing has steadily increased.
27
  Published case law from both 
federal and state courts confirms that prior to 1977, only three reported 
federal or state cases dealt directly with whistleblowing.
28
  During the 
1980s, however, over 300 published opinions addressed whistleblowing.
29
  
In the 1990s, 2,207 cases involved whistleblowing, seven times the number 
from the prior decade.
30
  For many employment lawyers in the mid-1990s, 
this increase made whistleblowing cases “the hottest niche of their 
                                                                                                                          
23 Marshal J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public 
Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1142 (1999); see also C. Fred 
Alford, Whistle-Blower Narratives: The Experience of Choiceless Choice, 74 SOC. RES. 223, 244 
(2007) (“[T]hose who raise ethical issues are treated as disturbed or morally suspect.”). 
24 144 Cong. Rec. S4397–98 (daily ed. May 6, 1998) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid). 
25 See Gene A. Brewer & Sally Coleman Selden, Whistle Blowers in the Federal Civil Service:  
New Evidence of the Public Service Ethic, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 413, 419 (1998) 
(describing negative stereotypes sometimes associated with whistleblowers). 
26 Id. 
27 See Eve Tahmincioglu, More Workers Willing to Blow the Whistle on Their Employer, 
NBCNEWS.COM (Sept. 15, 2012, 4:15 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44524270/ns/business-
careers/t/more-workers-willing-blow-whistle-their-employer/#.UFTf_o42d8t (noting the increase in 
whistleblower claims and analyzing possible causes). 
28 E.g., Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 201 F.2d 123, 125 (10th Cir. 1953) (affirming the 
district court’s dismissal of a wrongful discharge claim); Percival v. General Motor Corp., 400 F. Supp. 
1322, 1324 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (“[D]ischarge did not involve a breach of public policy sufficient to state a 
cause of action for wrongful or retaliatory discharge.”); Reagan v. Bichsel, 284 S.W.2d 935, 936–38 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (holding that a police officer’s suspension for conduct prejudicial to good order 
was supported by substantial evidence). 
29 The list of cases as of October 31, 2012 is on file with the author [hereinafter Whistleblower 
Cases].  
30 Id. 
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practice.”31  Finally, the number of whistleblower suits has tripled over the 
last decade, with over 7,700 published cases mentioning whistleblowing 
since January 2000.
32
  
This increase may be due to an increased willingness to confront 
corporate wrongdoing, or it could be because of an overall increase in the 
level of corporate corruption generally.  Regardless, this dramatic increase 
in litigation has prompted fears that whistleblowers are unduly disruptive 
and harassing.
33
 Several states have responded by modifying their 
whistleblower laws to make it clear that whistleblowers can be held liable 
for bringing frivolous claims.
34
  While a degree of skepticism about the 
merits of a complaint is justifiable, the legislative history behind these 
provisions confirms that a deep distrust of whistleblowers remains a part of 
American policymakers’ psyche.35 
B.  Whistleblowers as Heroes 
Ironically, the failure of public enforcement efforts to regulate 
                                                                                                                          
31 Gary Taylor, Blowing Whistles: Spilling Beans in the Private Sector Is Now a Big Legal 
Business, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 20, 1993, at 37. 
32 Whistleblower Cases, supra note 29.  This figure includes 6,118 reported cases between 
January 2000 and January 2011, with the remaining 1,582 cases being brought within the last eighteen 
months.  Id.  At this rate, more than seventy-three published judicial decisions impact whistleblowers 
every month.  
33 See Oklahoma to Stem Frivolous Whistleblower Claims, 7 INDIVIDUAL EMPL. RTS. LAB. REL. 
REP. (BNA) 2 (June 2, 1992); David Culp, Whistleblowers: Corporate Anarchists or Heroes?  Towards 
a Judicial Perspective, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 109, 131 (1995) (suggesting that implicit in judicial and 
legislative policies is the belief that employers ought to remain free to choose which employees to 
keep). 
34 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1-304(e)(1)–(f)(2) (2008) (providing that a statutory cause-
of-action for retaliatory discharge is not to be used for frivolous lawsuits or other “improper 
purpose[s],” and any employee who files a frivolous lawsuit is subject to sanctions, including 
attorneys’ fees).  Some states require good faith in bringing claims.  See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE  
§ 8547.2(e) (2012) (stating that a “[p]rotected disclosure” is a “good faith communication”); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 112.3187(9)(d) (West 2008) (requiring an employee who filed a “frivolous action in bad 
faith” to pay reasonable costs to the prevailing party); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:967(D) (2010) 
(stating that if a “complaint is brought in bad faith” or if court determines that the employer’s act is not 
in violation of law, then the employer may be entitled to compensation for attorney fees and court 
costs); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 185(e)(1) (2004) (providing that the “court may award 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs to the employer” for any action that is brought “without basis 
in law or fact”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-12 (2012) (stating that employers are prohibited from 
retaliating against any employee who “makes a good faith report . . . of a violation”).  At least one state 
requires both reasonableness and good faith.  E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52(A)(1)(a) (West 
2007).  Idaho discourages whistleblowers from bringing suit without any basis in law or fact since a 
court may order reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs for such actions unless the employee 
dismisses the action within a reasonable time after discovering that the employer is not liable for 
damages.  IDAHO CODE § 6-2107 (2010).  Finally, a few states including Connecticut, Hawaii, and 
Michigan require that the employee’s report not be knowingly false.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51m(b) 
(2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-62(1) (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 15.362 (2009). 
35 See Adler & Daniels, supra note 19, at 19, 29 (discussing requirements in state statutes that aim 
to prevent employees from making bad faith or frivolous claims). 
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corporations effectively using traditional command-and-control 
mechanisms has catapulted whistleblowers to the forefront of corporate 
governance.  Since 1934, the SEC, in conjunction with the Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”), has been the principal enforcer of securities laws.36  
However, major public scandals involving large corporations in the late 
1970s, and again in the late 1990s, made it evident to policymakers that 
effective corporate regulation depended not only on public enforcement by 
government agencies, but also on the participation of private citizens 
willing to bring compliance problems to light.
37
 
1.  Watergate’s Mark Felt 
The first transformative moment for whistleblowers in corporate 
governance was the Watergate scandal in the late 1970s.
38
  A 
whistleblower named Mark Felt (a.k.a. “Deep Throat”) helped Bob 
Woodward break the story that led to President Nixon’s resignation in 
1974.
39
  The revelation that President Nixon’s reelection campaign had 
used illegally acquired corporate funds to finance the break-in of the 
Democratic National Committee Headquarters eroded the trust of 
Americans in their government.  Subsequent investigations by the Senate 
and the Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, however, led to an 
even more startling revelation: hundreds of publicly traded U.S. companies 
had made corrupt foreign payments involving hundreds of millions of 
dollars.
40
  In fact, between 400 and 500 publicly traded companies, 
including Exxon and Lockheed Martin, admitted to having made 
questionable payments or outright bribes amounting to over $300 million 
to obtain contracts from foreign governments.
41 
                                                                                                                          
36 See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and 
Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Sept. 
24, 2012) (describing the SEC’s roles and responsibilities as an enforcement authority of the securities 
laws).  But see James D. Cox et al., SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 
737, 739 (2003) (noting that Congress, in the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, created a few express 
private causes of action). 
37 See Howard Rockness & Joanne Rockness, Legislated Ethics: From Enron to Sarbanes-Oxley, 
the Impact on Corporate America, 57 J. BUS. ETHICS 31, 31 (2005) (describing the role of the Enron 
scandal on regulatory policy); Alexander W. Sierck & Keith S. Watson, Post-Watergate Business 
Conduct: What Role for the SEC, 31 BUS. LAW. 721 (1976) (describing the role of Watergate on 
regulatory policy). 
38 See Sierck & Watson, supra note 37, at 724–26 (describing the expanded role the SEC has 
taken in determining what information a company must disclose). 
39 Todd S. Purdum, ‘Deep Throat’ Unmasks Himself:  Ex-No. 2 at F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 
2005, at A1; see also Schichor, supra note 14, at 273. 
40 Frederick M. Lawrence, In Memoriam, Archibald Cox, 85 B.U. L. REV. 355, 356 (2005); Matt 
A. Vega, Balancing Judicial Cognizance and Caution: Whether Transnational Corporations Are 
Liable for Foreign Bribery Under the Alien Tort Statute, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 385, 404–05 (2010) 
(arguing that the prohibition against foreign bribery has become customary international law). 
41 Vega, supra note 40, at 405. 
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In response, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
1977 (“FCPA”).42  The FCPA made bribery of foreign government 
officials a crime.
43
  It also required companies registered with the SEC to 
maintain accurate books and records and to develop a system of internal 
accounting controls.
44
  These internal controls included, among other 
things, establishing internal whistleblowing procedures.
45 
More than a decade passed, however, before either the SEC or the DOJ 
began to take FCPA enforcement seriously.  Eventually, however, the SEC 
and the DOJ began more aggressive enforcement efforts, and many of the 
enforcement actions were made possible by tips from corporate 
whistleblowers.
46
  While some continued to see whistleblowers as 
“traitorous violators of organizational loyalty norms,” others began to see 
them as “heroic defenders of values considered to be more important than 
company loyalty.”47  
2.  Enron’s Sherron Watkins 
The second transformative moment was the Enron and 
MCI/WorldCom financial scandals.
48
  The highlight of congressional 
hearings on Enron and MCI/WorldCom was testimony regarding the 
actions of two key whistleblowers, Sherron Watkins and Cynthia Cooper.
49
   
In her testimony, “Sherron Watkins revealed crucial details regarding 
Enron’s fraudulent activities.”50  Similarly, the CEO of MCI/WorldCom 
                                                                                                                          
42 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(b)(2), 30A, 32, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2), 78dd-1 to -2, 
78ff, (2006), added by Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (requiring accurate accounting and 
internal controls for all transactions and rendering bribes to foreign officials by company officers 
illegal with penalties such as fines and imprisonment). 
43 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to -2 (2006). 
44 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2006). 
45 See id. 
46 Schichor, supra note 14, at 292 (arguing that greater compensation for whistleblowers will 
encourage more to step forward and mitigate the personal impact whistleblowers endure). 
47 Joyce Rothschild & Terance D. Miethe, Whistle-Blower Disclosures and Management 
Retaliation, 26 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 107, 125 (1999).  
48 See Rockness & Rockness, supra note 37, at 31 (discussing how scandals such as Enron and 
WorldCom prompted Congress to respond with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to legislate ethical behavior for 
certain firms); J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the 
Collapse of American Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J. REG. 207, 259 (2003) 
(discussing how WorldCom’s deception “harmed the telecommunications industry,” and as a result led 
the Federal Communications Commission to respond). 
49 Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley 
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 74–75 (2007) (suggesting improvements to 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act based on analysis showing whistleblowers generally have been unsuccessful in 
winning compensation for their actions). 
50 Id.; see also The Financial Collapse of Enron-Part 3:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 14–15 (2002) 
(testimony of Sherron Watkins, Vice President of Corporate Development, Enron Corp.) (discussing 
the deceptive information that Sherron Watkins was aware of in her position at Enron). 
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testified about how an internal auditor named Cynthia Cooper had 
discovered the massive fraud orchestrated by the company’s CFO and 
reported it to the board of directors.
51
  These testimonies convinced 
legislators to do more to convince potential whistleblowers to come 
forward in future cases and to protect them from retaliation.
52
   
Accordingly, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(“SOX”),53 which included, among other things, the first set of 
comprehensive federal whistleblower provisions protecting employees who 
raise concerns about a violation of any federal criminal statute.
54
  Section 
301 of SOX requires that audit committees establish internal whistleblower 
procedures allowing employees to report anonymously concerns about 
questionable accounting or auditing.
55
  In addition, Section 1107 of SOX 
gives the DOJ discretionary authority to impose criminal penalties on 
companies or individuals that retaliate against whistleblowers who 
participate in an official proceeding or tender information directly to a law 
enforcement officer.
56
  Finally, Section 806 of SOX grants corporate 
whistleblowers the right to bring a private civil action if they were subject 
to retaliation for reporting a violation of any securities laws or SEC 
regulations.
57 
However, SOX went beyond merely protecting voluntary 
whistleblowers; it also mandated whistleblowing.  It required several key 
insiders, including corporate in-house lawyers and CEOs, to function as 
                                                                                                                          
51 Wrong Numbers: The Accounting Problems at WorldCom:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 129 (2002) (statement of John W. Sidgmore, President & CEO, WorldCom, 
Inc.). 
52 See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 4–5 (2002) (discussing the need to break the “code of silence” 
keeping potential whistleblowers from coming forward). 
53 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.). 
54 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1107, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (providing that covered employees 
who raise concerns about a violation of any federal criminal statute, not simply laws limited to financial 
fraud, cannot be retaliated against);  see also  Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. SEC, Opening 
Statement at SEC Open Meeting: Item 2 Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052511mls-item2.htm [hereinafter SEC Opening 
Statement] (acknowledging that SOX “made great strides in creating whistleblower protections and 
requiring internal reporting systems at public companies”). 
55 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(B) (2006). 
56 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1107, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2006).  The SEC has seldom, if ever, 
brought any criminal prosecutions under Section 1107 of SOX.  See Daniel P. Westman, The 
Significance of the Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Provision, 21 LAB. LAW. 141, 147 (2005) 
(establishing that there is no apparent record of any criminal prosecutions brought under Section 1107 
to date). 
57 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1980.101 
(2011) (interpreting Section 806 to hold not only corporations, but also individuals liable for retaliating 
against a whistleblower). 
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both gatekeepers and whistleblowers.
58
  SOX required that in-house 
attorneys, for example, report suspected violations up the ladder in the 
corporation and then report those violations to the SEC if the internal 
reports do not resolve the violations.
59
  SOX also imposed direct 
responsibility on executive officers.
60
  In addition to certifying the 
accuracy of the company’s SEC filings, the principal executive and 
financial officers must certify that they designed and evaluated the internal 
controls to ensure that any material information was made known to 
them.
61 
After the Enron and MCI/WorldCom hearings and the passage of 
SOX, whistleblowers were seen in a different light.  In particular, corporate 
whistleblowers were viewed as heroes serving a critical “gatekeeping” 
role.
62
  A broader conception of whistleblowing as a moral enterprise 
began to emerge, as the media described whistleblowers as unsung saviors 
and the new “saints of secular culture.”63  In 2002, for example, TIME 
magazine named Sherron Watkins and Cynthia Cooper as “Persons of the 
Year.”64  Even policymakers spoke more favorably of whistleblowers.  For 
example, Senator Charles Grassley, speaking of the IRS bounty program, 
called informants “patriotic and described them as protectors” of taxpayer 
dollars.
65 
                                                                                                                          
58 See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2–
3 (2006) (discussing the history, roles, and capabilities of gatekeepers); John C. Coffee, Jr., The 
Attorney as Gatekeeper:  An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1294 (2003) (arguing that 
securities attorneys do play a gatekeeping role that does not conflict with representing their clients and 
that the SEC should adopt standards that enhance this role); Caroline Harrington, Attorney Gatekeeper 
Duties in an Increasingly Complex World: Revisiting the “Noisy Withdrawal” Proposal of SEC Rule 
205, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 893, 896 (2009) (discussing the attorney’s role as a gatekeeper under 
SOX). 
59 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.3(b)(1), (b)(9) (2011). 
60 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2006). 
61 Id.  These provisions have been implemented by Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 Rules 
13a-14 and 13a-15.  17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-14, 240.13a-15 (2011).  See also Certification of Disclosure 
in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,276, 57,280 (Sept. 9, 2002) (explaining 
that the new Exchange Act Rules 13a-15 require issuers to file reports to maintain disclosure controls 
and procedures as defined in the new Exchange Act Rule 13a-14(c)). 
62 See Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra note 15, at 95 (implying that a bounty model to 
compensate whistleblowers is preferred because SOX fails to increase incentives for insiders with 
knowledge of fraud); Schichor, supra note 14, at 273 (explaining how a WorldCom whistleblower, 
Cynthia Cooper, “won applause from the media, Congress, and the general public” for playing a 
significant role in uncovering fraud). 
63 Colin Grant, Whistle Blowers: Saints of Secular Culture, 39 J. BUS. ETHICS 391, 398 (2002) 
(characterizing whistleblowers as achieving new, high moral ground in society); Richard Lacayo & 
Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year 2002: The Whistleblowers, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1003998,00.html (naming whistleblowers as 
“Persons of the Year”). 
64 Schichor, supra note 14, at 292; Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 63. 
65 Lobel, supra note 18, at 488 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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C.  Whistleblowers as Bounty Hunters 
The current global financial crisis has proven to be a third 
transformative moment for whistleblowers in corporate governance.
66
   
Despite increased enforcement efforts, securities fraud, foreign bribery, 
and other forms of corporate corruption are at an all-time high.
67
  The crisis 
began here in the United States with reports of a multi-million dollar Ponzi 
scheme on Wall Street,
68
 but the Bernie Madoff story was just the tip of the 
iceberg.
69
  From Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers to Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, “the events of the last decade demonstrate that securities 
fraud is repeatedly perpetrated against unsuspecting investors.”70 
Many legal scholars have blamed this financial crisis on, of all things, 
the lack of financial incentives for corporate whistleblowers.
71
  They have 
argued that SOX did not go far enough.
72
  What is needed, according to 
                                                                                                                          
66 See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The Global Financial Crisis and Its Impact on World Trade and 
the World Economy—An Overview, 41 UCC L.J. 375, 377–78 (2009) (discussing the historical 
significance and global impact of the ongoing financial crisis and the landmark structural changes that 
have resulted to prevent it from happening again). 
67 See, e.g., ETHICS RESEARCH CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY: AN INSIDE VIEW OF 
PRIVATE SECTOR ETHICS v (2007) (concluding that “[e]thical misconduct in general is very high and 
back at pre-Enron levels” within the national firms surveyed); KROLL, GLOBAL FRAUD REPORT: 
ANNUAL EDITION 2008/2009 6–7 (2008) (noting increases in overall incidence of corporate fraud and 
weakening internal controls among firms surveyed globally). 
68 See U.S. SEC, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO 
UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME 1–2 (2009), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf (detailing the SEC’s failures to detect the Madoff fraud). 
69 See Miriam H. Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 950 (2009) 
(arguing the meltdown of the mortgage security market came about because “numerous people in 
varying positions of public and private power ignored internal company policies, twisted regulatory 
requirements, or perpetrated outright violations of the law”). 
70 Elizabeth Cosenza, Is the Third Time the Charm?  Janus and the Proper Balance Between 
Primary and Secondary Actor Liability Under Section 10(b), 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1022 (2012) 
(arguing for amendment to the Exchange Act to overcome court imposed restrictions on private 
lawsuits against secondary actors). 
71 See Pamela H. Bucy, “Carrots and Sticks”: Post-Enron Regulatory Initiatives, 8 BUFF. CRIM. 
L. REV. 277, 318–22 (2004) [hereinafter Bucy, “Carrots and Sticks”] (arguing for a carrot approach to 
encourage provision of inside information to regulators); Cunningham, supra note 21, at 325 (“The 
prevailing regime’s overwhelming emphasis on sticks offers limited assurance of success.  That system 
failed during the late 1990s and early 2000s.”); Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural 
Model to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1133–38 (2006) [hereinafter 
Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model] (stating that the “pre-scandal versions of the Structural 
Model, like the Anti-retaliation Model, failed to encourage effective whistleblowing”); Rapp, Beyond 
Protection, supra note 15, at 93 (discussing the recent corporate scandals and suggesting financial 
incentives should be strengthened for whistleblowers).  But see Baer, supra note 69, at 950 (“[T]he 
meltdown of the mortgage security market . . . came about because numerous people in varying 
positions of public and private power ignored internal company policies, twisted regulatory 
requirements, or perpetrated outright violations of the law.”). 
72 See Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1769 (2007) 
(arguing that SOX fails to provide effective whistleblower protections); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, 
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these scholars, is a new government program to radically increase the 
economic incentives for whistleblowers to do the right thing.
73
  Professor 
Rapp, for example, in his influential article lamented the fact that SOX was 
just “defensive” and failed to “radically increase” financial incentives for 
whistleblowers.
74
  In fact, there was nearly universal support among legal 
scholars for a new bounty program.
75
  
A bounty program was not a completely new idea for the SEC.  In 
1988, Congress passed Section 21A(e) of the Exchange Act authorizing the 
SEC to award a bounty of up to 10% of the civil penalty recovered in 
insider trading cases.
76
  However, this insider trading bounty program had 
several shortcomings: first, the program only awarded whistleblowers for 
tips concerning insider trading that are, by their very nature, particularly 
secretive; second, the grant of any reward was within the sole discretion of 
the SEC; and third, it was seldom used.
77
  Not surprisingly, there were only 
seven payouts to five whistleblowers under the former program for a 
meager total of $159,537.
78
  Aware of these shortcomings, Professor Bucy 
(now Pierson) of the University of Alabama School of Law advocated for 
the significant ramping up of the SEC insider trading bounty program in a 
seminal article published less than two years after the insider trading 
bounty program was first established.
79
 
The Obama Administration quickly embraced the idea of a more 
                                                                                                                          
Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 183, 187–88 (2007) (“SOX does 
little to change the hazardous path whistleblowers must tread.”). 
73 See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, False Claims, Not Securities Fraud: Towards Corporate 
Governance by Whistleblowers, 15 Nexus: CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 61 (2009) [hereinafter Rapp, False 
Claims] (suggesting SOX’s anti-retaliation measures “may do little to alter the cost-benefit analysis 
engaged in by a potential whistleblower”). 
74 Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra note 15, at 95. 
75 See, e.g., M. Thomas Arnold, “It’s Déjà Vu All over Again”: Using Bounty Hunters to 
Leverage Gatekeeper Duties, 45 TULSA L. REV. 419, 459 (2010) (proposing the establishment of a 
bounty system); Barnard, supra note 2, at 409 (calling for the creation of an SEC bounty program for 
informants); Bucy, “Carrots and Sticks,” supra note 71, at 318–22 (recommending a system utilizing 
the carrot approach of the False Claims Act (“FCA”) private justice model); Cunningham, supra note 
21, at 327 (“Positive incentives can induce gatekeepers to perform vital functions that the current 
regime discourages them from performing.”); Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra note 15, at 92 (calling 
for the adoption of a bounty model). 
76 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (1988). 
77 See U.S. SEC, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC’S BOUNTY 
PROGRAM 2, 4, 12–13, 31 (2010) (providing an in-depth review of the bounty program and 
recommendations to improve functioning); Bruce Carton, SEC IG’s Report Details Insider Trading 
Bounties, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.complianceweek.com/sec-igs-report-details-
insider-trading-bounties/printarticle/188244/ (discussing the rarity of payments under the bounty 
program). 
78 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 111 (2010). 
79 Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1, 60–62 (2002).  This article was one of 
the first, if not the first, to propose using FCA-like qui tam enforcement to help police securities laws 
generally. 
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robust whistleblower bounty program as advocated by Professors Bucy and 
Rapp.  In 2009, the Administration floated a proposal to amend Section 
21F to expand the existing SEC program beyond insider trading and 
establish a fund to pay whistleblowers “significant financial awards” for 
tips.
80
  The proposal was made a part of the Investor Protection Act of 
2009, but the bill was never passed by the 111th Congress.
81
  Eventually, 
however, the 112th Congress authorized a new bounty program as part of 
the Dodd-Frank Act.
82
 
The new bounty program has led, almost overnight, to a whole new 
cottage industry of lawyers specializing in corporate whistleblowing.
83
  
Encouraged by several early signs, one major firm has declared 2012 to be 
the “Year of the Whistleblower.”84 
The downside of making whistleblowing highly profitable is that it 
may cause whistleblowers to lose some of their legitimizing status as 
corporate gatekeepers.  As bounty hunters, they become just the latest 
example of employee greed.  The bounty program assumes that corporate 
whistleblowers are selfish and greedy, and the agency appears to believe 
that it must appeal to their “self-interest” with insanely large incentives to 
get them to cooperate with external enforcement efforts.
85
  The entire 
premise of the bounty program is that only a large bounty will motivate a 
                                                                                                                          
80 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 70–
73, available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf. 
81 Investor Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3817, 111th Cong. § 203 (2009); Rapp, False Claims, 
supra note 73, at 58.  Professor Rapp proposes an even more radical idea that whistleblowers be 
permitted to bring qui tam actions on behalf of the federal government—as the shareholder-in-chief of 
several bailed-out American companies—against those who perpetrated what is traditionally thought of 
as only securities fraud.  Id. at 59–60.   
82 See infra Part III (discussing the details of the final program under Dodd-Frank Act). 
83 See, e.g., KLINE & SPECTER, http://www.attorneysforwhistleblowers.com (last visited Aug. 24, 
2012) (calling themselves “National Whistleblower Attorneys”). 
84 Phillips & Cohen, 2012: Year of the Whistleblower (Dec. 28, 2011), 
http://www.phillipsandcohen.com/P-C-News/2012-Year-of-the-Whistleblower.shtml.  The first signal 
came two days after the SEC announced its new bounty program, when the SEC dramatically increased 
the reward under its old insider-trading program.  See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. SEC, SEC Awards $1 
Million for Information Provided in Insider Trading Case (July 23, 2010), available at 
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21601.htm (announcing that the SEC paid its “the largest 
award . . . for information provided in connection with an insider trading case”).  Other telltale signs 
included increased activity pertaining to the bounty programs of other federal agencies.  For example, 
the DOJ announced a $750 million settlement of criminal and civil actions stemming from a 
whistleblower suit against the pharmaceutical manufacturer GlaxoSmithKline brought under the FCA.  
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Recovers $3 Billion in 
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2011 (Dec. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-civ-1665.html.  The IRS has enhanced its bounty 
program and recently paid out a $104 million whistleblower award. Jackson Lewis, IRS Awards 
Unprecedented $104 Million to Whistleblower (Sept. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsID=4195. 
85 See Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra note 15, at 111–13 (arguing that the decisions of potential 
whistleblowers are based on an analysis of the costs and benefits of coming forward). 
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sizable percentage of whistleblowers.
86
  Thus, the SEC’s program targets 
self-interested “bounty hunters,” rather than “real” (unselfish) 
whistleblowers, who cooperate because they believe it is the right thing to 
do or because they expect their cooperation to benefit others. 
III.  THE BASICS OF THE NEW BOUNTY PROGRAM 
The SEC’s new whistleblower bounty program requires that eligible 
persons who report potential securities law violations to the SEC be paid 
between 10% and 30% of the monetary sanctions imposed on any publicly 
traded company, financial services institution or other covered entity in 
any SEC action, in which the final judgment or order for monetary 
sanctions exceeds $1 million.
87
   
The SEC expects to receive 30,000 tips each year as a result of this 
new program.
88
  The SEC has said it will pay the highest awards to those 
individuals who provide specific, credible and timely information that 
saves the SEC weeks of investigation time.
89
  Therefore, the SEC has made 
providing tips as easy as possible.  The final rules set out a simplified 
procedure for a corporate whistleblower to submit information to the SEC 
without the need to alert his or her company,
90 
and this information is then 
shared throughout the agency.
91
  If the SEC eventually brings a covered 
action that is eligible for an award, a Notice of Covered Action is posted 
on the Office of the Whistleblower website.
92
  To date, a total of 320 cases 
have been listed on this website as potentially eligible for an award 
because in each case a court order was entered granting monetary sanctions 
                                                                                                                          
86 See id. at 113 (“[B]ecause potential whistleblowers will discount their expected recovery from 
whistleblowing by the chance that they will not receive such a recovery, and to account for the time 
value of money, a potential financial benefit may need to be quite large in order to stimulate a risk-
averse employee to blow the whistle.” (footnote omitted)). 
87 Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2010).  Within this mandatory range, the SEC 
maintains discretion over the actual percentage using criteria provided in the Dodd-Frank Act such as 
the significance of the whistleblower’s information.  Id.  The $1 million threshold amount can be 
reached by aggregating multiple cases brought to the agency by the same whistleblower.  Id. 
88 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,354 (June 13, 
2011). 
89 SEC Opening Statement, supra note 54. 
90 See Tips, Complaints and Referrals Portal, U.S. SEC, https://denebleo.sec.gov/TCRExternal/in
dex.xhtml (last visited Aug. 24, 2012).  Whistleblowers are instructed to complete a six-page form and 
mail or fax it to the SEC Office of the Whistleblower, or to submit it online through the SEC’s Tip, 
Complaint or Referral (“TCR”) Portal.  Id. 
91 See BOS. CONSULTING GRP., U.S. SEC ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY AND REFORM 44 (2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/967study.pdf (discussing the cross-divisional TCR 
project). 
92 Claim an Award, U.S. SEC, OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, http://www.sec.gov/about/office
s/owb/owb-awards.shtml (last visited Oct. 31, 2012). 
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exceeding $1 million.
93
  Individuals who submitted original information 
related to the covered action then have ninety calendar days from the date 
of the posting to apply for an award from the SEC Whistleblower Office.
94
 
When the SEC first released for comment the proposed rules 
implementing the Section 21F whistleblower bounty program, they 
received more than 240 comments and approximately 1,300 letters 
regarding the proposed rules.
95
  Some commenters suggested they had 
gone too far,
96
 while others insisted they did not go far enough.
97
  In 
response, the SEC revised its final rules to address many of these concerns.  
However, despite these efforts, even the SEC Commissioners remained 
divided three-to-two on whether to adopt the final rules.
98
   
The specific rules that most impact corporate whistleblowers and their 
relationship with their employers include provisions: (1) providing 
incentives for whistleblowers to report internally; (2) excluding certain 
categories of employees from being eligible for whistleblower payments 
altogether; and (3) broadening the definitions of the types of information 
which may be reported directly to the SEC for a bounty.
99
  The specifics of 
the rule choices in each of these areas are summarized below. 
A.  Internal Whistleblowing Incentives 
The SEC declined to require corporate whistleblowers to report 
violations internally to their employer first to be eligible for a bounty.
100
  
                                                                                                                          
93 Id.  In 2011, 217 cases were listed as eligible for an award.  Id.  An additional 103 cases have 
been posted on the SEC’s “Claim an Award” webpage so far in 2012.  Id. 
94 FAQs, U.S. SEC, OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/ow
b-faq.shtml (last visited Aug. 24, 2012).  The application does not mean that a whistleblower will 
automatically receive an award, but if the whistleblower does not submit an application he or she will 
have no chance of receiving an award.  Id. 
95 SEC Opening Statement, supra note 54. 
96 See, e.g., Comment from Cynthia M. Fornelli, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Audit Quality 4 (Dec. 23, 
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-242.pdf (suggesting that 
whistleblowers should not be eligible for an award without at a minimum concurrently reporting the 
violation internally). 
97 See, e.g., Comment from Eric Dixon 2 (Dec. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-221.pdf (arguing that the confidentiality provisions are 
not sufficient to provide assurance to whistleblowers). 
98 Josef Rashty, The Dodd-Frank Act Addresses Corporate Governance, CPA J., Apr. 2012, at 40.  
The new rules will take effect sixty days after their publication in the Federal Register.  See also  
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,300 (June 13, 2011). 
99 See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,301, 34,303 
(June 13, 2011) (discussing the proposed rules, comments received, and final rules).  The final rules 
also include anti-retaliation provisions, which I hope to argue in a later article provides unequal 
protection for victims of retaliation; namely, it protects external but not internal whistleblowers.  In 
addition, it does not adequately remedy SOX’s lack of extraterritorial application.  Id. at 34,303–04. 
100 Id. at 34,301.  The final rules do impose an exhaustion requirement similar to the one 
advocated in this Article, but only for individuals that have causal or assignment responsibility for the 
securities violation.  Id. at 34,316–19. 
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This prompted an outpouring of vigorous objections from the corporate 
community.
101
  They argued that the financial incentives would divert 
whistleblowers from internal reporting,
102
 and “[t]hese commenters further 
argued that companies and other entities would experience significant costs 
as a result.”103  On the other hand, whistleblower advocates argued that 
mandating internal whistleblowing is inconsistent with the statute and 
would dissuade whistleblowers from coming forward.
104
  In response, the 
SEC incorporated in its final rules several provisions that were intended to 
strengthen incentives for employees to report internally but that “ultimately 
. . . leave that decision to the whistleblower.”105  According to SEC 
Chairperson Mary Schapiro, “[o]ffering financial incentives for 
whistleblowers to report appropriate concerns to internal compliance is 
unprecedented . . . [but] incentivizing—rather than requiring—internal 
reporting is more likely to encourage a strong internal compliance 
culture.”106  
1.  120-Day “Look-Back” Period 
Under the final rules, a whistleblower is deemed to have reported 
information to the SEC on the date that he or she makes an internal report 
                                                                                                                          
101 See SEC Opening Statement, supra note 54 (“[M]any commenters vigorously asserted that 
these programs would only survive if the Commission required whistleblowers to first report internally 
before coming to us.”). 
102 See, e.g., Comment from David Hirschman, President and CEO, Ctr. for Capital Markets 
Competitiveness, U.S. Chamber of Commerce 12 (Dec. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-194.pdf (“In the absence of an affirmative restriction 
on external reporting when effective internal compliance channels are available, or provision of a 
significant incentive for using those internal channels, employees will face an irresistible temptation to 
go to the SEC with their report.”);  see also Comment from Cynthia M. Fornelli, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for 
Audit Quality 2 (Dec. 23, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-242.pdf 
(arguing that the credit offered for first reporting to an employer is not sufficient to encourage 
employees to utilize internal reporting processes); Comment from Richard F. McMahon, Exec. Dir., 
Edison Elec. Inst. 1 (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-
177.pdf (arguing that employees should be required to first use employer-sponsored recording 
procedures in order to be eligible for any bounty); Comment from Gen. Elec. Co. 3 (Dec. 17, 2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-179.pdf (“[W]e believe that the balance 
reflected in the Proposed Rules favors too heavily the promotion of whistleblower bounties at the 
expense of effective and efficient corporate compliance programs.”).    
103 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,359 (June 13, 
2011). 
104 See Douglas W. Baruch & Nancy N. Barr, The SEC’s Whistleblower Program: What the SEC 
Has Learned from the False Claims Act About Avoiding Whistleblower Abuses, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
ONLINE 28, 41 (July 25, 2011), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Baruch-Barr-
Whistleblower.pdf (discussing the voluntary nature of internal reporting and highlighting the incentives 
available to those who choose to first report internally). 
105 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,362 (June 13, 
2011). 
106 SEC Opening Statement, supra note 54. 
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to the company, so long as the whistleblower or the company subsequently 
reports the information to the SEC within 120 days of the initial internal 
report.
107
  If the company does not report back to the employee within the 
120-day period, the employee is then free to report the matter to the SEC 
and still be eligible for a bounty.
108
  Although the 120-day “look-back” 
period was not intended to be a deadline for companies to self-report to the 
SEC, it effectively limits the window of time that companies have to 
complete a thorough investigation because the company must beat the 
whistleblower to the Commission to avoid stiffer penalties.
109
 
2.  Internal Reporting as a Plus-Factor 
“[P]articipation by the whistleblower in internal compliance systems” 
is a plus-factor under the final rules that can increase the amount of the 
award.
110
  The Dodd-Frank Act set forth three general criteria the SEC 
must consider when determining the percentage of the whistleblower 
award within the range of ten and thirty percent.
111
  The SEC has added 
four additional criteria by which a whistleblower’s award percentage may 
be increased, including “the extent to which, a whistleblower reported the 
possible violation through effective internal whistleblower, legal, or 
compliance procedures before reporting the violations to the 
                                                                                                                          
107 SEC Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c)(3) 
(2012).  Originally, the SEC proposed a ninety-day “look-back” period but the Business Roundtable 
effectively argued companies needed more time to complete an internal investigation of potential 
violations, particularly allegations that raise complex issues or occur overseas.  Comment from 
Alexander M. Cutler, Chair, Bus. Roundtable Corp. Leadership Initiative 8 (Dec. 17, 2010), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-142.pdf [hereinafter Comment from Cutler].  
Partially conceding this point, the SEC added thirty days to the period of time in which an internal 
whistleblower can wait before coming to the SEC.  17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c)(3). 
108 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,319 (June 13, 
2011). 
109 See Baruch & Barr, supra note 104, at 41 (describing the incentives for a whistleblower by 
internally reporting). 
110 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,329, 34,360 
(June 13, 2011). 
111 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act specified three general 
criteria the SEC must consider:  
(I) the significance of the information provided by the whistleblower to the success 
of the covered judicial or administrative action; (II) the degree of assistance 
provided by the whistleblower and any legal representative of the  
whistleblower . . .[;] (III) [law enforcement’s] programmatic interest . . . in deterring 
violations of the securities laws by making awards to whistleblowers who provide 
information that lead to the successful enforcement of such laws. 
Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(c)(1)(b)(i) (2010).  The statute also authorizes “such additional 
relevant factors as the Commission may establish by rule or regulation.” Id. 
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Commission.”112  
In addition, the SEC added three criteria to the final rules which may 
decrease the amount of an award, including: (1) the culpability of the 
whistleblower; (2) an unreasonable reporting delay by the whistleblower; 
and (3) any interference with internal compliance and reporting systems by 
the whistleblower.
113
  According to the SEC, the threat of decreasing the 
amount of an award is intended to “minimize any incentive for 
whistleblowers to conceal misconduct or to delay reporting it” and “to 
increase the potential for a larger award.”114  However, the SEC readily 
admits “a whistleblower has the greatest likelihood of receiving an award 
if he reports misconduct to [the SEC] first.”115  Even the third criterion, 
which addresses interference with internal reporting systems, applies only 
in “cases where the whistleblower, while [voluntarily] interacting with his 
entity’s internal compliance or reporting system, interferes with or 
otherwise undermines the system’s integrity.”116  Therefore, these negative 
factors are not designed to encourage internal reporting.  At best, any 
reduction penalty is meant to encourage prompt external reporting, not to 
mandate internal reporting. 
Unfortunately, the SEC has provided very little guidance on how it 
will weigh either the positive or negative factors.  It appears the SEC has 
adopted a subjective effects-based approach to maximize prosecutorial 
discretion “[d]epending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.”117  
In fact, the SEC specifically states that a whistleblower who was especially 
helpful to the SEC “could receive the maximum award [of 30%] regardless 
of whether the whistleblower satisfied other factors such as participating in 
internal compliance programs.”118  To further cement the SEC’s ultimate 
discretion, the final rules make non-appealable both the final order 
regarding the amount of an award as well as “any factual findings, legal 
conclusions, policy judgments, or discretionary assessments” that the SEC 
                                                                                                                          
112 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,330 (June 13, 
2011). 
113 SEC Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Rule, 17 C.F.R.  
§§ 240.21F-6(b)(1)–(3) (2012); see also Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 34,300, 34,308 (June 13, 2011) (“If a whistleblower took any steps to undermine the integrity of 
[the employer’s internal compliance and reporting] systems or processes, we will consider that conduct 
as a factor that may decrease the amount of any award.”). 
114 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,350, 34,351  
n.391 (June 13, 2011). 
115 Id. at 34,351 n.391. 
116 Id. at 34,358 n.443.  
117 Id. at 34,331; see also id. (“[N]o attempt has been made to list the factors in order of 
importance, weigh the relative importance of each factor, or suggest how much any factor should 
increase or decrease the award percentage.”). 
118 Id.  
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makes in considering the Rule 21F factors.
119
 
3.  Full-Credit Provision 
Under the final rules, a whistleblower reporting original information to 
the company internally will also get credit for all information that is 
ultimately provided by the company to the SEC, regardless of whether the 
information was included in the whistleblower’s report to the company or 
obtained from an independent source.
120
  According to the SEC, “This 
could create an opportunity for a whistleblower to obtain an award through 
internal reporting where the whistleblower might not otherwise have 
qualified for an award because the information was not sufficiently specific 
and credible.”121  If more than one whistleblower contributes to a 
company’s investigation and report, all the whistleblowers will have to 
share the bounty because the aggregate amount of all whistleblower awards 
for the same or related SEC action cannot exceed thirty percent of the 
amount the SEC collects.
122
  This rule may actually exacerbate the number 
of vague and meritless complaints that are filed internally while 
simultaneously diverting the most serious reports of wrongdoing that may 
merit the maximum bounty to the SEC. 
B.  Eligibility Exclusions 
Under the final rules, employees with causal responsibility are 
ineligible for a whistleblower award.
123
  A person can be said to be 
causally responsible for a securities violation if his or her action or inaction 
contributes to the violation.  For example, if an employee bribes a foreign 
government official to secure a substantial government contract then he or 
she is causally responsible for the subsequent books and records violation.   
The SEC’s final rules attempt to account for this sort of responsibility by 
excluding from eligibility anyone who is convicted of a criminal violation 
that is related to the SEC action that resulted from the tip.
124
 
In addition, some employees with assignment responsibilities are not 
eligible for whistleblower payments.
125
  A person is understood to have 
assignment responsibility for some matter if it is part of his or her job 
duties.  The SEC partially accommodated this notion by excluding from 
the bounty program certain individuals whose job function is to detect or 
                                                                                                                          
119 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-13(a) (2012). 
120 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-4(c)(1)–(3) (2012). 
121 SEC Opening Statement, supra note 54. 
122 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-5(c) (2012). 
123 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(c)(3) (2012). 
124 Id. 
125 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,306 n.61 (June 
13, 2011).   
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investigate securities violations such as legal counsel, auditors, and internal 
compliance personnel.
126
  These exclusions reflect the SEC’s determination 
that at least some employees should not be permitted to “improperly use 
their positions to claim a reward.”127  However, the SEC failed to provide 
any accommodation for those companies that consider monitoring the 
workplace for illegalities in the job of every employee.
128
 
These eligibility exclusions, as promulgated in the final rules, are 
considerably weaker than the exclusions originally proposed by the SEC. 
For example, attorneys now qualify as whistleblowers where disclosures of 
information learned in connection with the legal representation of a client 
is otherwise waived or if disclosure is permissible pursuant to the SEC’s 
attorney conduct rules, applicable state statutes, or local bar rules.
129
   
Similarly, auditors and internal compliance personnel now qualify as 
whistleblowers when they have a “reasonable basis to believe” that the 
company is engaging in conduct that: (1) is “likely to cause substantial 
injury to the financial interest or property” of the company or investors; or 
(2) “will impede an investigation of the misconduct,” and at least 120 days 
have elapsed since the whistleblower reported the information internally to 
the company or became aware of information that was already known to 
the company.
130
 
C.  Qualifying Information Definitions 
The final rules also broaden the criteria for “information” that may be 
reported directly to the SEC for a bounty to include: (1) information 
regarding “possible” securities law violation that “has occurred, is 
ongoing, or is about to occur”;131 (2) information that causes the SEC to 
reopen an investigation or pursue a new line of inquiry in existing 
investigations;
132
 and (3) information that is provided even after the 
government begins an investigation if the information is deemed to have 
                                                                                                                          
126 Id. 
127 SEC Opening Statement, supra note 54. 
128 See, e.g., Comment from Susan Hackett, Senior Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Ass’n of 
Corporate Counsel 2 (Dec. 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-
126.pdf (insisting that “all employees are responsible for ensuring that the company operates within the 
bounds of the law and ethics”). 
129 See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,306 (June 
13, 2011) (outlining comments that called for the exclusion of persons with employment duties to 
perform from acting as a whistleblower).   
130 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(v) 
(2012).  
131 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(1) (2012). 
132 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,323–24 (June 
13, 2011). 
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“substantially contributed” to the success of the ongoing investigation.133  
Critics argue these broad definitions of qualifying information will likely 
open the SEC floodgates to complaints based on sheer conjecture and 
speculation.
134
  Early reports from the SEC, however, suggest that the 
quality of tips has not diminished.
135
  Regardless, the SEC needs to provide 
whistleblowers with clearer guidance on what constitutes qualifying 
information regarding possible violations.  
IV.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW BOUNTY PROGRAM 
The primary problem with the new SEC whistleblower bounty 
program that this Article seeks to address is that it relies too much on 
financial incentives.  The stated goal of the SEC’s new bounty program is 
to “incentivize those close to a fraud [or other securities violation] to come 
forward and provide information to the Commission” so that the SEC can 
bring more targeted public enforcement actions.
136
  Thus, the SEC’s 
primary focus is on how best to increase tips leading to successful 
prosecutions.
137
   
During the rulemaking process, the SEC considered a mandatory 
internal pre-reporting requirement where a whistleblower’s award 
eligibility would be conditioned on his first making a report internally and 
providing the company’s internal compliance function a reasonable period 
of time to respond.
138
  However, the SEC rejected mandatory internal 
                                                                                                                          
133 Id.  Only if the government requests information directly from the whistleblower (or anyone 
representing the whistleblower) will the whistleblower be deemed ineligible for a bounty.  17 C.F.R.  
§ 240.21F-4(a)(2) (2012).  In addition, while a request from any state authority would have 
automatically disqualified an individual from collecting a bounty under the rules as originally 
proposed, the final rules provide that only a request from a state attorney general or securities regulator 
made in connection with an investigation, inspection, or examination would serve as a disqualification. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(5) (2012). 
134 See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,338 (June 
13, 2011) (outlining the comments made regarding the procedures that attorneys should follow when 
receiving tips that may not be based on fact). 
135 See SEC Issues First Whistleblower Program Award, U.S. SEC (Aug. 21, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/2012/dig082112.htm (explaining that the early successes of the 
whistleblower program is due to the quality of tips received).   
136 SEC Opening Statement, supra note 54; see also Securities Whistleblower Incentives and 
Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,359 (June 13, 2011) (stating that “the principle purpose of the 
statute . . . is ensuring that the [SEC] receives quality tips” for their money); S. REP. NO. 111-176 at 
110 (2010) (“The Whistleblower Program aims to motivate those with inside knowledge to come 
forward and assist the Government to identify and prosecute persons who have violated the securities 
laws.”). 
137 SEC Opening Statement, supra note 54; see also Securities Whistleblower Incentives and 
Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,359 (June 13, 2011) (“[T]he principal purpose of the statute, 
which is ensuring that the Commission receives quality tips as a result of the financial incentive[s].”).   
138 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,361 (June 13, 
2011). The SEC also considered mandatory simultaneous reporting, under which the whistleblower’s 
eligibility is conditioned upon a simultaneous report to internal compliance and the SEC.  Id.  
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whistleblowing, believing it could result in less external whistleblowing to 
the SEC.
139
  Effectively, this relegates corporate whistleblowers to being a 
mere instrumentality of the SEC.  In fact, the SEC’s only concern since the 
program was enacted, at least publicly, has been to alleviate concerns 
about the quality of tips being diminished.
140
 
Most of the legal scholarship on bounty programs has also tended to 
focus on whether informants will “bring[] information about . . . fraud [and 
other securities violations] to light.”141  The flow of information is one of 
the “classic objective[s] of corporate governance”;142 however, it is not the 
only objective.  By focusing exclusively on the utilitarian function of 
whistleblowing, even on something as valuable as whistleblowing’s 
contribution to corporate transparency, we avoid the moral questions 
surrounding whistleblowing altogether.  Is it really the case that “[s]o long 
as the information is sound, its recipient should be indifferent to the 
informant’s motivations?”143  What if the informant is only coming 
forward out of a desire to avoid punishment for himself?  What if selfish or 
evil motives tempt an informant to falsify or embellish the information?
144
  
Doesn’t the difficulty of testing either the informant’s motives or the 
information’s reliability make it all the more important to insist that he or 
she demonstrate some good faith attempt to cooperate with the employer’s 
compliance efforts before passing the information on to the SEC?   
In this Part, I argue we must go beyond incentives and consider the 
moral implications of whistleblowing.  I am not arguing against using 
financial incentives; rather, I am arguing against only using financial 
incentives.  Emphasizing only the power of large monetary rewards and 
ignoring morality not only hampers a corporation’s ability to address 
compliance problems, it can make those compliance problems worse.  The 
SEC should reject its “mere instrumentality” approach to whistleblowing 
for at least three reasons: (1) it suppresses “real” whistleblowing; (2) it 
increases retaliation against whistleblowers; and (3) it undermines 
corporate compliance generally. 
                                                                                                                          
Additionally, the SEC considered “mandating that a whistleblower report internally within a specified 
period of time after reporting to [the SEC], unless upon reviewing the submission [the SEC] direct[s] 
the whistleblower not to report internally.”  Id. 
139 See id. (describing an approach based on avoiding implementation of a mandatory pre-
reporting or a simultaneous reporting requirement because it would not provide any cost-benefit 
advantage). 
140 Press Release, U.S. SEC, SEC Adopts Rules to Establish Whistleblower Program (May 25, 
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-116.htm. 
141 Rapp, False Claims, supra note 73, at 57. 
142 Id. at 62 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
143 Fisher et al., supra note 22, at 128. 
144 See id. (outlining the possibility that some whistleblowers’ information may be unreliable due 
to self-interested motives). 
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A.  Suppression of “Real” Whistleblowing 
The first consequence of overemphasizing financial incentives is that it 
suppresses “real” whistleblowing.145  It does so in at least two distinct 
ways: (1) by discouraging internal whistleblowing; and (2) by over 
incentivizing external whistleblowing. 
1.  Discouragement of Internal Whistleblowing 
The subtle message of the new bounty program is that whistleblowers 
are selfish and respond only to radical financial incentives.  This implies 
that selfish opportunistic behavior is the norm and, moreover, that it is 
legally permissible.  OBM research indicates that these sort of social cues 
encourage employee opportunism—especially when they come from a 
governmental authority—and become a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy.146  
The SEC final rules repeat the same message that “greed is good” by not 
mandating internal whistleblowing.
147
 This discourages internal 
whistleblowing because it disconnects whistleblowing from any moral 
obligation to first work internally with the company to see if there really is 
a problem, or if it can be solved.  In settling on this rule, the SEC is 
signaling that most whistleblowers are motivated by monetary reward.  
Empirical studies have shown that a person’s behavior is heavily 
influenced by his or her expectation of how others will act in similar 
circumstances.
148
  Thus, to the extent that a whistleblower thinks others are 
not willing to risk retaliation by internally reporting a potential violation, 
the whistleblower will be less willing to take the risk himself or herself.  
The SEC should, instead, make internal whistleblowing the default 
rule.  This would promote the idea that whistleblowing can and should be 
done for reasons other than financial gain.  Despite the potential for 
incurring costs in terms of time, money, social stigma, and a possible job 
                                                                                                                          
145 Comment from Allstate Ins. Co. et al. (Dec. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-189.pdf (“If personnel charged with responding to 
internal reports of wrongdoing were in a position to benefit financially from disclosing such 
information to the SEC, corporate compliance functions could soon grind to a halt.  The very people 
charged with orchestrating a company’s response could choose financial self-interest over corporate 
responsibility.”); Comment from U.S. Chamber of Commerce Ctr. for Capital Mkts. Competitiveness 
& U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform 2 (May 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-316.pdf (“By making . . . individuals eligible to serve 
as whistleblowers and receive a substantial bounty, the Proposed Rules [which overemphasize financial 
incentives] would put these professionals in the position of potentially deciding between self-interest 
and the interest of their employer.”). 
146 See STOUT, supra note 12, at 247–48 (2011) (arguing that unselfish behavior is encouraged by 
the social cues of authoritative figures). 
147 The quote, “greed is good” is from the fictional character Gordon Gekko in Oliver Stone’s 
movie.  WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1987).   
148 See STOUT, supra note 12, at 248 (arguing that people who believe others are acting selfishly 
will act selfishly themselves). 
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loss, many employees are motivated to blow the whistle out of a sense of 
justice, guilt, or simply because it is the right thing to do.
149
  A recent study 
suggested whistleblowers are often emboldened (or at least sustained) by 
personal religious beliefs, and are more credible as a result.
150
  The SEC 
has argued, unconvincingly, that whistleblowers who are predisposed to 
report internally will do so irrespective of the rule.
151
  However, 
researchers in organizational behavior have found that the vast majority of 
whistleblowers are, in fact, more likely to selfishly act like bounty hunters 
when the proper authorities say such selfishness is appropriate or when 
they believe others would act selfishly.
152
  In other words, corporate 
compliance programs work in large part because a consensus arises that 
bypassing hotlines violates the internal norm of cooperating.
153
  Therefore, 
SEC rules are needed to define specific behavior that complies with the 
cooperation norm. 
2.  Overincentivization of External Whistleblowing 
Second, the bounty program also suppresses “real” whistleblowing by 
over incentivizing external whistleblowing.  The most significant 
difference between bounty hunters and “real” whistleblowers is not what 
they are saying or even what they are seeking.  It is what they are willing 
to ignore; namely, bounty hunters will ignore opportunities to take 
proactive measures to prevent or remedy compliance problems.  The SEC 
                                                                                                                          
149 See Anthony Heyes & Sandeep Kapur, An Economic Model of Whistle-Blower Policy, 25 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 157, 159 (2009) (providing a short review of academic literature on sociology and 
psychology and listing non-monetary motives for whistleblowing); Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Whistle-
Blowers’ Experience in Fraud Litigation Against Pharmaceutical Companies, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1832, 1834 (2010) (listing the following as primary motivations for qui tam lawsuits: self-preservation, 
justice, integrity, altruism, and public safety); see also NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWER CTR., IMPACT OF QUI 
TAM LAWS ON INTERNAL COMPLIANCE: A REPORT TO THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION 1, 6 
(2010) [hereinafter NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR. REPORT], available at www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
33-10/s73310.shtml (arguing that whistleblowers are not motivated by monetary gain such as 
whistleblower rewards).  
150 Daniel Martin, Whistle Blowing, Religiosity, Spirituality and Integrity: Understanding the 
Impact of Social Dominance Orientation and Environmental Context, J. MORAL OCCUPATIONAL 
PSYCHOL. at 10 (forthcoming Dec. 11, 2011) (citing several studies regarding the link between 
whistleblowing and religiosity), available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970970; see also Eamon Javers, 
Religion, Not Money, Often Motivates Corporate Whistleblowers, CNBC Special Series “Bounty 
Hunters,” Special Report (Feb. 12, 2011), available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/41494697/Religion_No
t_Money_Often_Motivates_Corporate_Whistleblowers (reporting that experts say religion is a 
common trait among whistleblowers).   
151 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,325, 34,361 
(June 13, 2011).  
152 See STOUT, supra note 12, at 119 (“[T]he vast majority will act selfishly when . . . [the] 
authority says selfishness is appropriate, you believe others would act selfishly, and you believe 
unselfish cooperation would provide only small benefits to other.”). 
153 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1253 
(1999) (arguing that corporate actors are motivated by social norms and financial gain). 
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assumes that the employee will always make the right choice regarding 
whether to collaborate with his or her employer or not.
154
  So long as the 
employee does not actively interfere with an internal investigation, SEC 
Chairperson Mary Schapiro stated it is the SEC’s judgment that the 
whistleblower “is in the best position to know which route is best to 
pursue.”155 This, she argues, “strikes the correct balance . . . between 
encouraging whistleblowers to pursue the route of internal compliance 
when appropriate—while providing them the option of heading directly to 
the SEC.”156  
The SEC, however, grossly underestimates how much large bounties 
will incentivize bounty hunters to ignore the norm of internal reporting and 
to adopt a “wait-and-see” attitude.  In 2010, according to NERA Economic 
Consulting, the average SEC settlement was $18.3 million.
157
  In 2011, as 
the SEC began implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, all median settlement 
values increased except for the largest settlements against company 
defendants.
158
  In the first half of 2012, the median settlement with 
companies again rose.
159
  For example, the average settlement for a FCPA 
violation rose significantly from $11.9 million in 2011 to $20.8 million in 
2012.
160
  If this amount continues to climb, then whistleblowers can 
reasonably expect the average bounty to be well within the range of $2 
million to $5 million.
161
  While the SEC’s first whistleblower program 
                                                                                                                          
154 See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,331 n.274 
(June 13, 2011) (stating that the effectiveness of the final rule relies on whistleblowers to determine 
whether reporting internally would be appropriate or not). 
155 SEC Opening Statement, supra note 54. 
156 Id. 
157 NERA Economic Consulting Releases 2010 SEC Settlement Trends Report, NERA ECON. 
CONSULTING (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.nera.com/83_7105.htm.  The average SEC settlement amount 
increased from $10.9 million in 2009 and from $4.6 million in 2008.  Id.  However, the median 
company settlement in 2010 fell to $799,000 as compared to $1 million in 2009.  Id. 
158 See ELAINE BUCKBERG, JAMES OVERDAHL & MAX GULKER, SEC SETTLEMENT TRENDS: 
2H11 UPDATE 1 (2012), available at http://www.nera.com/67_7591.htm (finding that the median 
settlement value increased for both companies and individuals, high-value settlements with individuals 
“reached post-SOX highs,” but high-value settlements with companies declined); id. at 8 (“The average 
settlement value for companies decreased from $18.5 million in [2010] to $7.4 million in [2011], 
although more than half of this decrease is due to the $550 million settlement with Goldman Sachs, 
which is the third-largest settlement since SOX.  Excluding the Goldman settlement, the average 
company settlement in 2010 was $12.3 million.”).   
159  See JAMES A. OVERDAHL & ELAINE BUCKBERG, SEC SETTLEMENT TRENDS: 1H12 UPDATE 1 
(2012), available at http://www.nera.com/67_7764.htm (finding that the median settlement value for 
individuals “continued to follow the upward path observed since [2010]” but the median settlement 
value for companies “declined after reaching a record value in [2011]”); see also id. at 7 (finding that 
the the only notable exception to the upward trend for average values of settlements with companies 
was for Ponzi schemes, where the average decreased from $4.8 million to $1.1 million).   
160 Id. at 7.   
161 This is just an estimate.  The SEC’s final rules implementing the Section 21F whistleblower 
bounty program did not go into effect until August 12, 2011, and the SEC’s fiscal year ended 
September 30, 2011.  U.S. SEC, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 
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award was only $50,000,
162
 more awards are expected in the near future.
163
  
When the bounty hunter and his or her attorney stand to gain such a sizable 
amount of money, some of them will inevitably choose to lie, remain 
silent, or at a minimum, drag their feet, if it will mean the difference 
between a payout and no payout.
164
  This was a key concern for AT&T in 
their comments to the proposed rules.
165
  The telecommunications giant, 
which employs over 266,000 employees, convincingly argued that plaintiff 
attorneys stand to gain considerable profit from encouraging their clients to 
keep silent longer.
166
   
The SEC claims that its final rules “should mitigate any diversion 
effect” by providing that an internal report “can increase both the 
probability and the magnitude of a potential recovery.”167  According to the 
SEC, reporting internally increases the probability of an award because it 
creates “two paths to a recovery—[an SEC] investigation, or an internal 
corporate investigation.”168  The SEC further maintains reporting internally 
increases the magnitude of a potential award because the award criteria 
include a “plus-factor for participation in an entity’s internal compliance 
procedures.”169  
However, both of the SEC’s arguments fail to account for the 
likelihood that a company that first receives an internal report will take 
                                                                                                                          
3, 5 (2011) [hereinafter SEC ANNUAL REPORT], available at www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/whistlebl
ower-annual-report-2011.pdf.  The SEC did not have sufficient time to process any applications during 
fiscal year 2011.  Id. at 8.  Therefore, it is still too early to know for sure.   
162 See SEC Issues First Whistleblower Program Award, U.S. SEC (Aug. 21, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/2012/2012-162.htm (explaining that the award represents the full 
thirty percent of the $150,000 collected so by on a court order of more than $1 million in sanctions).   
163 See SEC Whistleblowers Waiting for Big Payouts as Rumors of First Award Mount, 
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/31/sec-whistleblower-reward-
payout_n_1560044.html (May 31, 2012, 5:41 PM) (“Rumors are running wild that the first payout will 
come any day now.”).  But see Paul Tharp, SEC Set to Hand out up to $452 Million to Whistleblowers, 
N.Y. POST, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/whistleblower_gold_EgZdzyFPP8vZ8IraUSMvx
O (July 10, 2012, 4:37 PM) (“SEC officials would not say when the first awards under the program 
would be made.”).    
164 See Stefan Rützel, Snitching for the Common Good:  In Search of a Response to the Legal 
Problems Posed by Environmental Whistleblowing, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1, 44 (1995) 
(arguing that financial rewards are inappropriate because they increase the danger of frivolous 
complaints, the costs offset any potential savings, and they may have been unnecessary). 
165 Comment from Wayne Watts, Senior Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel, AT&T 1 (Dec.10, 
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-102.pdf [hereinafter Comment 
from Watts] (emphasizing that whistleblowers should not be rewarded who “engage in, perpetuate, or 
fail to take action to stop internal wrongdoing”).  
166 Id.; Global 500 Rankings, CNNMONEY.COM, 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2011/snapshots/2756.html (last visited Sept. 3, 
2012).   
167 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,360 (June 13, 
2011). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
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lawful steps to reduce or avoid the monetary sanctions.
170
  Under current 
SEC guidelines, a monetary penalty will be lower if a company thoroughly 
investigates, takes remedial action and then promptly self-reports than if 
the SEC initiates the contact with the company.
171
  Therefore, internal 
whistleblowers stand to gain less than external whistleblowers who go 
directly to the SEC without affording the company the opportunity to 
mitigate the damage.  The SEC can use a “plus-factor” to adjust the award 
upward where the internal reporting potentially resulted in a lower 
monetary sanction; however, the SEC makes no guarantee that the higher 
percentage given to internal whistleblowers will be enough to make up the 
difference.  Moreover, in cases where a company’s prompt remedial action 
avoids sanctions altogether or keeps the sanctions under the million-dollar 
threshold, there would be no bounty awards because a greater percentage 
of zero is still zero.  Therefore, it seems certain that no matter how you 
calculate it, there will be fewer and less timely internal whistleblowings 
once bounty hunters and their attorneys do the math.
172
 
In the end, the message that the SEC is sending is that there is nothing 
wrong with bypassing the internal reporting system—that whistleblowing 
is valued not for its own sake, but only as an instrumentality.  Such a 
message will significantly diminish the force of the corporate norm of 
internal reporting.  Just as the FCPA and SOX supported strong corporate 
compliance cultures by throwing the force of law behind the norm, the 
Dodd-Frank Act reduces the moral force of whistleblowing by 
withdrawing support for one of its principal norms. 
B.  Increase of Retaliation 
The second major consequence of the bounty program is it will likely 
increase retaliation against corporate whistleblowers.  One of the primary 
justifications given for implementing the bounty program was that radical 
financial incentives are needed to help employees overcome their fear of 
retaliation, but this is a red herring.  It is certainly true that retaliation, as 
                                                                                                                          
170 Comment from Palmina L. Fava, Paul, Hasting, Janofsky & Walker LLP 1 (Dec. 16, 2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-137.pdf (arguing that the financial 
incentives offered in the whistleblower program can create “a conflict of interest between the 
company’s desire to cooperate with the government in an effort to earn preferred treatment and a 
possible reduction in penalties, and the whistleblower’s possible incentive to maximize the company’s 
exposure and thus extract a larger personal pay-day”). 
171 SEC Whistleblower Rules Encourage Internal Investigations, MILBANK LITIG. (June 3, 2011), 
http://www.milbank.com/images/content/5/4/5447.pdf (asserting that companies that self-report 
violations will be rewarded by the SEC for their cooperation). 
172 The SEC’s 2012 Annual Whistleblower Report, which will provide the first actual data on 
payouts, is not expected to be released until late 2012.  See SEC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 161, at 
1–2 (stating that the Commission’s Office of the Whistleblower is required to report annually at the end 
of the fiscal year, which ends in September). 
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well as other social and psychological factors, can have a chilling effect on 
certain whistleblowers.
173
  However, this is best remedied by increasing 
legal protection from retaliation, not by increasing non-mutual financial 
interests.  In fact, if anything, allowing employees to blindside their 
employers by externally reporting potential securities law violations will 
increase, rather than decrease, retaliation by increasing intrafirm 
adversarialism.   
The term “adversarialism” is generally used to describe a preexisting 
case or controversy between opposing parties.
174
  In the context of 
corporate whistleblowing, adversarialism has come to have a double 
meaning.  First, it refers to the adversarialism between corporations and the 
SEC.  The SEC assumes that modern corporations are profit driven and 
equates this with greed.
175
  Greed is now thought to be, in the words of 
Judge Easterbrook, “the engine that propels a market economy.”176  When 
                                                                                                                          
173 See, e.g., Comment from Julie Grohovsky, Wu, Grohovsky & Whipple et al. 4 (Dec. 16, 2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310.shtml (arguing that if whistleblowers were 
required to report internally they would likely remain silent); see also Pamela H. Bucy, Information as 
a Commodity in the Regulatory World, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 905, 950 (2002) (summarizing statistics about 
the retaliation and effects of whistleblowing on whistleblowers); Kesselheim et al., supra note 149, at 
1834 (stating that whistleblowers who complained internally had their complaints dismissed, and that 
the whistleblowers feared losing their jobs); Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra note 15, at 95–96 (stating 
that whistleblowing imposes psychological burdens on the potential whistleblower, including the fear 
of being blacklisted from future employers and social ostracism); Luigi Zingales, Want to Stop 
Corporate Fraud? Pay Off Those Whistle-Blowers, WASH. POST (January 18, 2004), at B2 (arguing 
that whistleblowers are considered spies and ostracized by there employers); Comment from Eric 
Dixon, Eric Dixon LLC 2 (Dec. 19, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-
10/s73310-221.pdf (“The identification of whistleblowers exposes them to serious risk, including 
physical harm to them and their families, professional or career reprisals and community ostracization.  
Whistleblowers may also face retaliation from alleged wrongdoers or their associates, including civil 
suits.”). 
174 MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 19 (11th ed. 2005) (defining “adversarial” 
as “relating to, or characteristic of an adversary or adversary procedures,” and “adversary” as “having 
or involving antagonistic parties or opposing interests”). 
175 See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Relevance of Corporate Theory to Corporate and Economic 
Development: Comment on the Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality 
Theories, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1489, 1491, 1494 (2006) (asserting that corporations historically 
existed to further the common good while corporate charters focused more on the protection of the 
public interest than on the financial interests of its corporate shareholders, but that this so-called “grant 
theory” died out after the Civil War because of the enactment of general incorporation laws first in 
New Jersey and later in Delaware, which eventually lead to a widespread race to the bottom among all 
of the states). 
176 Wilkow v. Forbes, Inc., 241 F.3d 552, 557 (7th Cir. 2001).  Judge Easterbrook believes that 
corporations are, by design, solely profit driven and incapable of assuming moral responsibilities; this 
view is also known as contractarianism.  FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 4 (1991).  Contractarians argue against any corporate law 
rules that mandate or inhibit particular governance relationships—except perhaps to counteract market 
failure.  See id. at 1 (stating that corporate managers use their control to exploit investors and 
consumers); see also JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION:  THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND 
POWER 69 (2004) (arguing that corporations are programmed to exploit others for profit); David K. 
Millon, New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians and the Crisis in 
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it comes to compliance, the SEC further assumes this profit motive is 
incompatible with the legal compliance goals of a regulator like the SEC. 
Instead, companies are said to be driven by the “invisible hand” of self-
interest.
177
 According to the SEC, when a corporation receives an internal 
report of wrongdoing, it will most likely retaliate against the 
whistleblower, cover-up the illegality, or both.
178
 
Second, the SEC has introduced adversarialism into the relationship 
between corporations and their employees.
179
  The agency assumes that 
whistleblowers are less protected when they are reporting internally than 
when reporting externally; therefore, the final rules permit whistleblowers 
to bypass the internal reporting system altogether.  This fosters intrafirm 
adversarialism between the company and its employees where none 
previously existed, which, in turn, only increases retaliation.
180
  
To try to reduce the risk of increased retaliation, the SEC has reserved 
the right not to take any action that might reveal the whistleblower’s 
identity until it actually files the enforcement action.
181
  The SEC may, 
“upon receiving a whistleblower complaint, contact a company, describe 
the nature of the allegations, and give the company an opportunity to 
investigate the matter and report back,” but not disclose the informant’s 
identity.
182
  In determining what information, if any, to give to a company, 
the SEC “may consider a number of factors, including, but not limited  
to . . . the nature of the alleged conduct, the level at which the conduct 
allegedly occurred, and the company’s existing culture related to corporate 
governance.”183  Keeping the whistleblower’s identity confidential, 
                                                                                                                          
Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1373, 1377–78 n.19 (1993) (asserting that Judge 
Easterbrook is a leading proponent of contractarianism and he would advocate a substantial body of 
rules designed to counteract market failure). 
177 See 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 456 (R. H. Campbell et al. eds., Liberty Press 1981) (1976) (concluding that “[b]y pursuing 
his own interest [Economic Man] frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he 
really intends to promote it”).  
178 See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,361 (June 13, 
2011) (citing retaliation and cover-ups as reasons for not mandating internal reporting); see also 
Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 319, 374 (2005) (stating that potential whistleblowers are often financially dependent on the 
corporation and subject to their reprisals). 
179 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,300–01 (June 13, 
2011) (stating that the final rule does not require a whistleblower to report internally first). 
180 See Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Whistle-Blowing: Myth and Reality, 22 J. MGMT. 507, 
509 (1996) (citing two 1995 studies concluding that external whistleblowers may be more likely to 
suffer retaliation than internal whistleblowers). 
181 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21F(h)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2) (2010) (providing that 
the SEC “shall not disclose any information, including information provided by a whistleblower to the 
Commission, which could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower”). 
182 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,323 (June 13, 
2011). 
183 Id. at 34,323 n.197. 
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however, will hamper the corporation’s ability to fully respond to the 
allegations.  Furthermore, anonymous complaints are less reliable than 
reports from known informants.
184
 
The solutions to whistleblower retaliation are more comprehensive 
protections and legal remedies, not simply more financial incentives on the 
front end.  There are several gaps in the existing anti-retaliation laws that 
Congress should immediately address if it is serious about achieving 
justice for corporate whistleblowers.
185
  While the private enforcement 
efforts of whistleblowers clearly have a role to play in corporate 
governance, the key is timing.  Introducing adversarialism too early in the 
compliance process will supplant internal corporate compliance efforts 
with conventional command-and-control regulations that, as discussed 
next, have proven ineffective and only lead to more corporate opportunism.  
C.  Undermining of Corporate Compliance 
The third consequence of the bounty program is it undermines a 
corporation’s ability to create an effective compliance culture from the 
inside out.  Over the last decade, the SEC has repeatedly acknowledged 
that internal compliance programs are vital to the prevention and detection 
of securities violations.
186
  After the Enron scandal, then SEC Chairman, 
William Donaldson, contended that a company’s single most important 
asset is its “moral DNA.”187  He strongly advocated establishing “a culture 
that puts ethics and accountability first” and that avoids the “common trap 
of mere compliance.”188  As recently as last year, the SEC affirmed that 
“internal reporting to effective compliance programs can provide valuable 
assistance to [the SEC’s] own enforcement efforts.”189  The new bounty 
                                                                                                                          
184 See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269 (2000) (affirming that “anonymous tips . . . are 
generally less reliable than tips from known informants and can form the basis for reasonable suspicion 
only if accompanied by specific indicia of reliability” in the appeal of a criminal case). 
185 In another article, I plan to discuss the implications of the principle of restorative justice for 
whistleblowers.  At a minimum, restorative justice requires applying the whistleblower laws 
extraterritorially, granting whistleblowers a broader private right of action, and creating a 
comprehensive whistleblower compensation fund to cover non-pecuniary damages suffered as a result 
of more subtle forms of retaliation.  See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61, 71 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding 
that provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley do not extend to private company employees); William Villanueva 
v. Core Labs. NV, No. 09-108, 2011 WL 6981989, at *6–8 (DOL Adm. Rev. Bd. Dec. 22, 2011) 
(discussing the lack of statutory language governing extraterritorial disclosures); Schichor, supra note 
14, at 292–95 (arguing that non-pecuniary damages are necessary to protect against employer 
retaliation). 
186 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,323 (June 13, 
2011). 
187 William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. SEC, Remarks Before the Economic Club of New 
York (May 8, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch050803whd.htm.  
188 Id. 
189 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,360 (June 13, 
2011). 
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program, however, threatens to undermine a corporation’s efforts to 
regulate itself. 
1.  Ignoring of Regulatory Standards 
The SEC’s new bounty program ignores pre-existing regulatory 
standards that mandate internal reporting systems.  The legal requirement 
that corporations have adequate systems of internal controls dates back to 
1977, when Congress amended the federal securities laws with the 
enactment of the FCPA, and 2002, when Congress passed SOX and 
ushered in the modern self-regulation approach to corporate regulation.
190
  
For example, SOX requires that a company’s annual report must include a 
statement of the management’s responsibility over internal controls and 
reporting; a statement on the framework used to evaluate those controls 
over the past year; management’s assessments of the effectiveness of these 
controls over the past year, with an identification of any material 
weaknesses; and a statement that the issuer’s auditors have attested to 
management’s assessment of internal controls.191  SOX also required the 
SEC to issue rules to require issuers to disclose whether they have codes of 
ethics applicable to senior financial officers.
192
  Accordingly, the SEC 
passed implementing rules requiring issuers to disclose in their annual 
reports whether the company has adopted a code of ethics and to file a 
copy with the SEC.
193
  Although the SEC rules do not specify the exact 
details that must be included in a code of ethics, one of the matters which 
is most often addressed in a code of ethics is the prompt internal reporting 
of code violations.  
The SEC has also promoted internal compliance programs through the 
threat of increased liability.  Shortly before the enactment of SOX, for 
example, the SEC issued the so-called Seaboard Report that announced 
                                                                                                                          
190 See Carl Pacini, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Taking a Bite out of Bribery in 
International Business Transactions, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 545, 576 (2012) (explaining that 
the FCPA requires internal controls, though it does not define them); SEC Opening Statement, supra 
note 54 (acknowledging that SOX “made great strides in creating whistleblower protections and 
requiring internal reporting systems at public companies”).  State law also now emphasizes the need for 
directors of publicly traded companies to be concerned about internal control systems in fulfilling their 
duty of care responsibilities.  See also In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–70 
(Del. Ch. 1996) (explaining company’s duties to act in good faith, monitor its own business decisions, 
and keep their company compliant with all laws). 
191 Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Certification of 
Disclosure in Exchange Report Periodic Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636, 36,642 (June 8, 2003). 
192 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 406, 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2006). 
193 17 C.F.R. § 229.406 (2012); see also Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 5,110, 5,117–20 (Jan. 31, 2003) (explaining the disclosures 
required and how they are to be made). 
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thirteen factors the SEC considers when bringing enforcement actions.
194
  
The second factor in the Seaboard Report asks whether the company had 
an internal compliance program.
195
  Other factors ask about the corporate 
culture and the tone at the top,
196
 how the company monitors compliance, 
investigates reports of misconduct and corrects any misconduct 
discovered,
197
 and whether the organization learned from the misconduct 
by modifying its compliance program to better deter and prevent similar 
misconduct in the future.
198
 
Since then, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were revised to reflect 
the need for more effective and robust internal compliance systems.
199
  A 
corporation may generally be held criminally liable for securities law 
violations that are (1) connected to and committed in the course of 
employment, (2) for the benefit of the corporation, and (3) with the 
authorization or acquiescence of the corporation.
200
  However, mitigating 
factors under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines include the presence of 
“an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law” by corporate 
agents.
201
  Thus, while corporations are required by law to establish an 
                                                                                                                          
194 Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, 
Exchange Act Release No. 44,969, 2001 WL 1301408 (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Seaboard Report], 
available at www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm.  The report is referred to as the 
“Seaboard Report” because the report summarizes why the SEC would not take enforcement action 
against a parent company—Seaboard Corporation—for accounting misconduct at one of its divisions 
after the parent company took prompt remedial action and fully cooperated with the SEC.  Compliance 
101—The Seaboard Report, CORP. COMPLIANCE PROF. BLOG (July 11, 2005), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/compliance_prof/2005/07/compliance_101__1.htm.  
195 Seaboard Report, supra note 194 (“What compliance procedures were in place to prevent the 
misconduct now uncovered?  Why did those procedures fail to stop or inhibit the wrongful conduct?”).  
The Seaboard Report does not, however, discuss how to evaluate the effectiveness of a compliance 
program. 
196 Id. (asking, under Factor 1, whether the misconduct “result[ed] from inadvertence, honest, 
mistake, simple negligence, reckless or deliberate indifference to indicia or wrongful conduct, willful 
misconduct or unadorned venality” and whether the company’s auditors were mislead, and asking, 
under Factor 3, where the misconduct occurred in the organization and whether senior management 
turned a blind eye to the misconduct). 
197 Id. (providing, in Factors 4–10, the questions to ask regarding the length of the misconduct, the 
harm caused by the misconduct, how the misconduct was discovered and by whom, the effective 
response time, the steps taken by the company to stop the misconduct, the company’s cooperation, and 
its commitment to finding the truth). 
198 Id. (“What assurances are there that the conduct is unlikely to recur?  Did the company adopt 
and ensure enforcement of new and more effective internal controls and procedures designed to prevent 
a recurrence of the misconduct?  Did the company provide our staff with sufficient information for it to 
evaluate the company’s measures to correct the situation and ensure that the conduct does not recur?”). 
199 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2011) (requiring due diligence for 
the prevention of misconduct, and promotion of a culture of compliance). 
200 10 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 4942 (rev. vol. 2010). 
201 See Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 34 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 743, 784 (1992).  The other potential mitigating factor is the extent of the corporation’s 
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internal reporting system, the new bounty program allows and even 
incentivizes employees to disregard these internal compliance systems.  
Without employee participation, however, these corporate systems cannot 
be expected to effectively prevent or detect violations of the law.
202
 
2.  Ignoring Best Practices 
The SEC’s new bounty program also ignores accepted “best practices” 
established by experts in the field of corporate compliance.  Most public 
companies have spent considerable time and effort over the last couple of 
decades building state-of-the-art internal reporting and compliance 
programs.  In most cases, these compliance efforts are more than just 
cosmetic.
203
  The keystone of these programs is the employees in the field 
that have access to first-hand information and are in the best position to 
detect and prevent potential securities violations.  They are supported by a 
wide range of personnel tasked with following up on employee complaints, 
including internal auditors, human resources directors, in-house counsel 
specializing in regulatory affairs and compliance officers.
204
   
Most public companies have implemented several alternative internal 
reporting mechanisms including: (1) an open door policy which allows 
reporting potential violations or complaints to a supervisor, or when the 
supervisor is implicated in the alleged misconduct, allows bypassing the 
chain-of-command and reporting suspected violations or complaints 
directly to senior management or the compliance office;
205
 (2) a toll-free 
whistleblower tip hotline;
206
 and, in many cases, (3) an ombudsmen 
                                                                                                                          
cooperation with law enforcement officials. Id. Aggravating factors considered in assessing a 
corporation’s culpability include: “(1) the involvement in or tolerance of criminal activity by ‘high 
level’ or ‘substantial authority’ personnel; (2) a recent history of similar misconduct [by the 
corporation]; (3) violation of a judicial order or condition of probation; and (4) [corporation’s] 
obstruction of justice.”  Id. 
202 See SEC Whistleblower Rules Encourage Internal Investigations, MILBANK LITIG. (June 3, 
2011), http://www.millbank.com/images/content/5/4/5447.pdf (examining the role of the employee 
whistleblower and the new rules surrounding reporting). 
203 But see Kimberly Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 
81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491 (2003) (arguing that “a growing body of evidence indicates that internal 
compliance structures do not deter prohibited conduct within firms, and may largely serve a window-
dressing function that provides both market legitimacy and reduced legal liability”). 
204 Robert Lupone, Corporate Compliance: The Role of Company Counsel, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 491, 526 (2008). 
205 Nat’l Council of Nonprofit Ass’n, Whistleblower Policy-Sample, ASHP.ORG, 
http://www.ashp.org/s_ashp/docs/files/about/Affiliate_Whistleblower_Sample.pdf (last visited Sept. 
25, 2012). 
206 See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., UNITED STATES: PHASE 3 REPORT ON THE APPLICATION 
OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 2009 REVISED RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 18 (2010) [hereinafter ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV.], 
available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-
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program.
207
  Along with other best practices,
208
 these internal reporting 
mechanisms encourage a culture of compliance transparency that takes 
compliance seriously and often spurs companies to achieve norms that are 
actually better than what the law requires.
209
  By allowing employees to 
bypass these mechanisms altogether, the new bounty program will not only 
render these internal reporting mechanisms useless, but it will promote the 
very culture of opportunism that these compliance systems are intended to 
combat.  
As currently implemented, the bounty program jeopardizes the ability 
of corporations to maintain a strong compliance culture.  As discussed 
earlier, the SEC leaves it up to the employee to decide whether the 
company has an effective internal reporting system or not.
210
  If in the 
employee’s opinion, the employer’s reporting system does not pass muster, 
then the employee is free to ignore it and proceed directly to the SEC.
211
  
                                                                                                                          
briberyconvention/46213841.pdf (highlighting the use of U.S. companies’ whistleblower tip hotlines); 
see also Comment from Cutler, supra note 107, at 4 (explaining the “value of the hotline for reporting 
unethical activities and as a means for reducing corporate culpability”). 
207 See Lobel, supra note 18, at 497 (“Employees are more likely to use internal procedures when 
the procedures are formally established and the corporation asserts its commitment to a fair process.  
Thus, many companies have created an ombudsman position within the firm . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).   
An ombudsman is a quasi-independent person within the corporation who specializes in hearing 
complaints, managing conflicts, and monitoring legal compliance.  Id.; see also Martin Lipton, SEC 
Adopts New Rules to Encourage Whistleblowers, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. 
REG. (June 30, 2011, 9:50 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/06/30/sec-adopts-new-
rules-to-encourage-whistleblowers/ (explaining the measures used by public companies to “enhance the 
effectiveness of their internal compliance systems” and acknowledging the integral nature of such 
measures). 
208 For a list of other related best practices such as cultivating a tone at the top with 
communications from the CEO emphasizing the importance of legal compliance and ethics, adopting 
codes of conduct, conducting ongoing ethics and compliance training and education for employees, 
investigation reports of misconduct promptly and thoroughly, and taking appropriate remedial action, 
see ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 206, at 46–47.  See also Comment from Cutler, supra 
note 107, at 4 (describing procedures of compliance in place to prevent securities law violations);  
Comment from Susan Hackett, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Ass’n of Corp. Counsel 3 (Dec. 
17, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-144.pdf (suggesting further 
provisions, such as barring short sellers from “obtaining a second bite at the apple through the 
whistleblower process,” and ensuring that prospective whistleblowers make timely reports of 
misconduct, to prevent securities fraud stemming from the new whistleblower policies). 
209 See Lori A. Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations U.S. SEC, 
Speech by SEC Staff: The Culture of Compliance at Spring Compliance Conference: National 
Regulatory Services (Apr. 23, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042303lar.htm 
(“[I]t’s not enough to have policies.  It’s not enough to have procedures.  It’s not enough to have good 
intentions.  All of these can help.  But to be successful, compliance must be an embedded part of your 
firm’s culture.”). 
210 See SEC Opening Statement, supra note 54 (discussing the balance reached between 
encouraging internal compliance and allowing the whistleblower to bypass that option if necessary 
because “it is the whistleblower who is in the best position to know which route is best to pursue”). 
211 See id. (stating that the whistleblower has the option of reporting internally or going directly to 
the SEC).   
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The SEC’s final rules effectively prevent corporations from requiring their 
employees to follow their own internal policies and procedures.  A recent 
report by Littler Mendelson found that 96% of executives surveyed were 
either moderately or very concerned about potential whistleblower claims 
against their companies in light of the new program.
212
 
Admittedly, most companies have not yet noticed much of an impact 
on their internal compliance programs.
213
  This may be because 
whistleblowers and their attorneys are still learning how to run the gantlet.  
In addition, many corporations have taken counter measures to increase 
employee training on how to report wrongdoing and to increase 
management training on how to respond to such reports.
214
  In a recent 
survey conducted by the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics and 
its affiliated Health Care Compliance Association, three-quarters of 
respondents reported increasing communication to employees on reporting 
wrongdoing since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.
215
  In addition, 66% 
of survey respondents (72% of respondents from publicly traded 
companies) reported an expected increase in management communication 
about handling allegations of wrongdoing.
216
  This significant increase in 
in-house compliance training may help to buoy internal whistleblowing for 
the time being.
217
  If so, we are not likely to see the negative effects of the 
bounty program on corporate culture until a critical mass or tipping point is 
reached; however, at that point it may be too late to do anything about it.   
The SEC insists that the quality of tips has not been diminished, and 
therefore, any attempt now by Congress to fix it would be premature.  
However, this pragmatic approach to policy making ignores how law 
shapes culture, and culture shapes behavior.
218
  Presently, no substantial 
                                                                                                                          
212 LITTLER MENDELSON, WHISTLEBLOWER SURVEY 1 (2011), available at http://www.littler.co
m/files/press/related-files/Littler-Whistleblower-Survey-Nov-2011.pdf.  
213 See NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR. REPORT, supra note 149, at 5 (“The existence of a . . . 
whistleblower reward program has no impact on the willingness of employees to internally report 
potential violations of law, or to work with their employer to resolve compliance issues.”). 
214 Allan Dinkoff, Corporate Compliance Programs After Dodd-Frank, WEIL.COM 13–16 (Oct. 
2011), http://weil.com/files/upload/Corporate_Compliance_Post_Dodd_Frank_AELC_Oct.11.pdf 
(discussing the different new initiatives that companies can take to ensure effective compliance). 
215 HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE ASS’N & SOC’Y OF CORP. COMPLIANCE & ETHICS, DODD-FRANK: 
BIG HEADLINES, NOT-SO-BIG IMPACT 4 (2011), available at http://www.hcca-
info.org/Resources/View/ArticleId/195/Survey-by-SCCE-and-HCCA-Reveals-Little-Impact-of-Dodd-
Frank-Act.aspx. 
216 Id. at 5. 
217 Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model, supra note 71, at 1142–43 (“A disclosure 
channel also harmonizes with a whistleblower’s tendency to report misconduct internally . . . by this 
sense of loyalty. . . . [Internal reporting] fits well with the psyche of the American employee, whose 
sense of loyalty to the organization keeps her from reporting misconduct externally, but who may 
report internally if encouraged by the organization.” (footnotes omitted)). 
218 For example, at one time bribery was considered business as usual in many parts of the world.  
However, the FCPA led to similar anti-bribery laws being established around the world.  Today, nearly 
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bounties have been paid out.
219
  But even one or two sizable awards to the 
wrong people may be able to radically change the compliance culture in 
many corporations by successfully allying fears of any consequences for 
departing from the norm of internal reporting.   
Ironically, “evil” corporations will welcome employees bypassing 
internal reporting because it will lower their compliance costs.  Fewer 
complaints mean fewer investigations.  Moreover, the SEC can target only 
a small fraction of the over 15,000 public companies; therefore, there is 
little increased risk of public enforcement.  In anticipation of this, the SEC 
indicated early on that it plans on forwarding whistleblower tips to the 
employer for an early response.
220
  In that case, the only difference will be 
that the SEC will introduce adversarialism into the process prematurely.  
This will cause internal investigators to go into defense mode.  In doing so, 
the SEC will discourage in-house compliance personnel and lawyers from 
sharing information with employees, learning from employees, or 
otherwise involving employees in mutually beneficial problemsolving 
efforts.  
3.  Ignoring Public Enforcement Limitations 
Despite corporations’ best efforts, most scholars recognize the need for 
some threat of prosecution.  A growing body of research confirms the need 
to maintain a significant background threat of external enforcement.
221
  In 
general, the law promotes self-regulation by presupposing adversarialism, 
and then rewarding individual companies who demonstrate exceptional 
cooperation with a less adversarial or less punitive regime.  This is 
generally known as the “carrot and stick” approach.222  Relying heavily on 
this traditional approach, the SEC has taken the position that internal 
compliance programs cannot serve as complete substitutes for the 
                                                                                                                          
every country prohibits bribery of government officials.  Over a dozen international anti-bribery 
conventions have been signed and/or ratified by over 200 countries.  The result is bribery is no longer 
generally acceptable in international business.  See Vega, supra note 40, at 391 (arguing that the 
prohibition against foreign bribery has become customary international law). 
219 But see S.E.C. Makes First Bounty Award to Dodd-Frank Act Whistleblower, JACKSON LEWIS 
LLP (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsID=4178 (announcing that the 
first and only bounty paid out to date was $50,000). 
220 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,323 (June 13, 2011).  
221 See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING 
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (Donald R. Harris et al. eds., 1992) (discussing how regulators influence 
not only through actual prosecution but public threat of prosecution).  See also John W. Maxwell, Self-
Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism, 43 J. L. & 
ECON. 583, 603 (2000) (positing that “firms engage in more self-regulation when they perceive a 
greater threat of government regulation”). 
222 Kara Blanco & Rebecca E. Whitacre, The Carrot and Stick Approach: In Terrorem Clauses in 
Texas Jurisprudence, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1127, 1128–29 (noting that the “stick” in this type of 
approach is “a threatened punishment, which will be used if the carrot [or potential reward] is not 
sufficient” to elicit compliance). 
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government’s obligation to identify and remedy securities law 
violations.
223
  In addition to implementing the new bounty program, the 
SEC has recently undergone a major revamping and is now doubling down 
on its enforcement efforts.
224
   
While the SEC must do everything it can to ensure compliance with 
corporate laws, it must also recognize that external whistleblowing will not 
be enough.  Increasing the number of tips reported to the SEC will not by 
itself reduce securities law violations for several reasons.  First, the SEC 
does not have the resources to engage in the kind of large-scale, ongoing 
interventions needed to create a permanent solution using the traditional 
command-and-control approach.
225
  Although the Dodd-Frank Act reflects 
a broad congressional mandate, the agency did not receive any additional 
funding.  Given its limited resources, it is critical that the SEC find a way 
to give whistleblowers a role in the compliance process without 
abandoning the modern experiment in self-regulation. 
Second, the SEC also has a checkered history when it comes to taking 
prompt corrective action.  For example, several members of Congress 
criticized the SEC for failing to promptly act against firms involved in the 
financial crisis despite being put on notice by several early indicators.
226
  
Others also fault the SEC, which ignored a 1999 letter accusing Bernard 
Madoff of conducting a massive Ponzi scheme, for the resulting debacle on 
Wall Street.
227
   
Finally, there is little evidence that civil and criminal penalties and 
settlements can address the more systemic problems in corporate 
                                                                                                                          
223 Securities Whistleblowers Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,000, 34,324 (June 13, 
2011) (noting that although the SEC “believe[s] that internal compliance programs play an important 
role” in the identification of securities law violations, such programs “are not substitutes for rigorous 
law enforcement”). 
224 See The Securities and Exchange Commission Post-Madoff Reforms, U.S. SEC, 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/secpostmadoffreforms.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2012) (describing the 
SEC’s revamping of its policies and procedures and systems for handling whistleblower complaints 
and tips).   
225 David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings: A New 
Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307, 310–11 (2008).  The traditional approach 
gives corporations substantive rules and then relies on top-down enforcement by agencies.  Id. at 311 
(noting the deficiencies in such an approach, as it can lead to “cosmetic compliance programs or 
calculated cooperation with the government”). 
226 Edward Wyatt, SEC Is Pursuing More Inquiries Tied to the Financial Crisis, Chairwoman 
Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2010, at B2 (stating that the SEC drew criticism from Congress, as well as 
investor groups, for “a lack of prominent enforcement cases against firms that played a major role in 
the financial crisis, which cost individual and institutional investors billions of dollars in losses”). 
227 See Binyamin Appelbaum & David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Didn’t Act on Madoff Tips, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 16, 2008, at D1 (“The SEC had the authority to investigate Madoff’s investment business, 
which managed billions of dollars . . . . Financial analysts raised concerns about Madoff’s practices 
repeatedly over the past decade, including a 1999 letter to the SEC that accused Madoff of running a 
Ponzi scheme.  But the agency did not conduct even a routine examination of the investment business 
until [December 2008].”). 
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governance.
228
  The SEC has dramatically increased the number of civil 
and criminal public enforcement actions against corporations for the last 
several years, resulting in record fines and onerous settlement agreements.  
And despite these aggressive enforcement efforts, the level of white-collar 
crime and fraud is still increasing.
229
  If compliance were based solely on 
the threat of liability, we would expect the level of compliance to have 
gone up, but in fact it has gone down significantly over this time period.
230
  
Thus, even if the SEC’s new whistleblower bounty program results in 
significantly more enforcement actions, monetary fines are unlikely to 
effect the desired change in corporate compliance.
231
   
Given the inherent limitations of public enforcement efforts, there are 
two important questions.  First, what are the long-term negative effects of 
the bounty program on corporate compliance?  Second, what is its likely 
effect on the moral legitimacy of corporate whistleblowers?  Common 
sense tells us the solution to corporate opportunism cannot be a program 
that encourages employee opportunism.  What is needed is a coherent 
regulatory philosophy to guide regulators as to when to require internal 
whistleblowing and when to encourage external whistleblowing to 
maximize corporate self-regulation without sacrificing the whistleblower’s 
morality. 
V.  THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MORAL WHISTLEBLOWING 
Corporate whistleblowing must be shaped.  Moral principles, not just 
economic interests, should inform this reshaping.  Cultivating a strong 
moral basis for whistleblowing can overcome transactional costs and other 
purely economic obstacles that a “mere instrumentality” approach to 
whistleblowing cannot;
232
 however, corporate whistleblowing is first and 
                                                                                                                          
228 See Hess & Ford, supra note 225, at 310–11 (discussing how prosecutors and enforcers do not 
have adequate resources nor a mandate to engage in effective corporate governance). 
229 See, e.g., ETHICS RESEARCH CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY: AN INSIDE VIEW OF 
PRIVATE SECTOR ETHICS v (2007), available at http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/The_2007_National_Bu
siness_Ethics_Survey.pdf (concluding that “[e]thical misconduct in general is very high and back at 
pre-Enron levels” within national firms surveyed); KROLL, supra note 67, at 6–7 (noting increases in 
overall incidence of corporate fraud and weakening internal controls among firms surveyed globally). 
230 ETHICS RESEARCH CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY: AN INSIDE VIEW OF PRIVATE 
SECTOR ETHICS v (2007), available at http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/The_2007_National_Business_Et
hics_Survey.pdf. 
231 See Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Law Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 
757, 766–72 (2005) (discussing the limitations of monetary fines as a tool to effect large-scale reform 
of organizational culture). 
232 See MARK CASSON, THE ECONOMICS OF BUSINESS CULTURE: GAME THEORY, TRANSACTION 
COSTS, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 255 (1991) (noting that third party organizations such as the 
state can reduce transaction costs by punishing cheaters, and thus allowing actors to trust each other); 
see also Eisenberg, supra note 153, at 1274 (observing that moral whistleblowing reduces transactional 
costs and enhances performance in ways incentive-based SEC rules and regulations alone cannot). 
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foremost a moral enterprise.  Therefore, the SEC should treat 
whistleblowing not just as the profitable thing to do, but also as the right 
thing to do.   
The place to start is with the distinction between internal and external 
whistleblowing.  This distinction can be most clearly seen by viewing the 
whistleblowing enterprise through the lens of (1) the common good of 
mutual self-interest and (2) the principle of subsidiarity.  Internal 
whistleblowing is mandated, according to the first guiding principle, by the 
basic good of community within corporations and the norm of cooperation.  
The second principle affirms the primacy of internal whistleblowing over 
external whistleblowing.  Together, these two principles support the claim 
that whistleblowers have a moral duty to make a good faith effort to work 
internally with the company to solve compliance problems before resorting 
to external whistleblowing. 
The remainder of this Part explores how these two guiding principles 
can help reshape the SEC’s new whistleblower bounty program to ensure it 
is properly oriented with the moral considerations underlying 
whistleblowing. 
A.  The Principle of Mutual Self-Interest 
One of the primary questions that the SEC should ask is what role does 
the employer’s and the employee’s mutual self-interest play in corporate 
compliance?  By not requiring employees to make a good faith effort to 
report potential violations internally before attempting to collect a bounty, 
the SEC program unnecessarily risks destroying the basic good of 
community within corporations.  A proper normative framework would 
recognize the importance of the employer and the employee’s shared 
interest in cooperating to solve compliance issues.  Although a full 
framework is beyond the scope of this Article, a good start would be to 
recognize what many perfectionist legal scholars call “the common good” 
of mutual self-interest.
233
  Mutual self-interest is an aspect or instantiation 
of the basic human good of community.
234
  This simple but profound idea 
                                                                                                                          
233 FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 10, at 305.  The term “common good” refers to “the good 
of individuals, living together and depending upon on another in ways that favour [sic] the well-being 
of each.”  Id.  It includes factors which “make sense of or give reason for [an employee’s] collaboration 
with [an employer] and would likewise, from their point of view, give reason for [an employer’s] 
collaboration . . . with him.”  Id. at 154; see also ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL 
LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 162–63 (1993) (describing the moral perfectionism of Joseph Raz, 
which includes the idea that governments may advance individual autonomy by “protecting morally 
valuable options for choice” through social policies). 
234 In his various writings, Finnis identifies seven basic goods, the intrinsic value of which is self-
evident to all rational human beings.  These include: knowledge; life; work and play; friendship and 
association (or sociability); aesthetic experience; practical reasonableness; and religion.  It is from these 
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is essential to implementing the SEC’s new bounty program without 
undermining preexisting and future internal compliance and reporting 
systems.  
The SEC generally assumes that self-interest will stymie most, if not 
all, legitimate compliance efforts.  This adversarial (or contractarian) 
approach to corporate regulation is what led the SEC to conclude that if 
corporations are driven by profit to avoid costly regulatory compliance, 
then conversely, a lucrative bounty program is needed to counter that urge 
by financially incentivizing employees to report a corporation’s 
noncompliance.  Self-interest, however, does not alone lead to corporate 
fraud and corruption.
235
  Although the employer and the employee are both 
driven by self-interest, this shared self-interest does not make the corporate 
enterprise immoral or evil.
236
  On the contrary, this arrangement not only 
permits both parties to make money, but it also provides a forum in which 
people can exercise their talents, find fulfillment, and realize their values.  
It is only when they are acting pursuant to non-mutual interests (i.e., 
perverse ulterior motives) that self-interest is a real issue.  Just like bribery, 
kickbacks, and financial fraud, laws and regulations that undermine mutual 
self-interest are bad for business.
237
  These corrupting influences are not 
just illegal or damaging to a company’s reputation; they destroy the 
cooperative relationships intrinsic in all corporations that are necessary for 
the company to be profitable.  They transform cooperative relationships 
into “relationships of mistrust, antagonism and exploitation.”238  Therefore, 
the most successful corporate compliance regulations will promote the 
common good of mutual self-interest in minimizing the costs of 
                                                                                                                          
basic goods that natural law theorists argue all other human goods derive their value.  FINNIS, 
NATURAL LAW, supra note 10, at 85–90. 
235 See JIM COLLINS, GOOD TO GREAT: WHY SOME COMPANIES MAKE THE LEAP . . . AND OTHERS 
DON’T 41 (2001) (observing the importance to an organization’s success of having the right individuals 
within that organization, which can be extended from for-profit purposes to ones of social 
responsibility); Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Internal Whistleblowing:  
Protecting the Interests of the Employee, the Organization and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 267, 299–301 
(arguing that the actions of internal whistleblowers and their employers serve the interests of these 
parties by avoiding adverse publicity and legal consequences, while also reforming their organization 
from within). 
236 Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 235, at 299–303 (arguing that self-interest is not inherently 
wrong).  
237 See Stefan Rützel, Snitching for the Common Good: In Search of a Response to the Legal 
Problems Posed by Environmental Whistleblowing, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1, 44 (1995) 
(arguing that while “monetary incentives may encourage whistleblowing, and while self-interest as a 
motive for reporting is not inherently wrong, financial rewards are seemingly inappropriate” because 
they “increase[] the danger of frivolous complaints,” their costs offset any potential savings, and they 
may have been unnecessary). 
238 Sean Kelsey & Thomas R. Krause, Leading with Ethics: The Cooperative Model and the 
Example of Workplace Safety, in RETHINKING BUSINESS MANAGEMENT: EXAMINING THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF BUSINESS EDUCATION 118, 119 (Samuel Gregg & James R. Stoner, Jr. eds., 2008). 
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noncompliance for both the company and its employees.  
Unfortunately, the SEC’s new bounty program actually undermines the 
collaborative or cooperative relationship between the employer-company 
and the employees by promoting employee non-mutual interest in a 
bounty.  The prospect of a multi-million dollar bounty may overcome 
certain self-interests and transaction costs preventing corporate 
whistleblowers from collaborating with the government, but only at 
considerable cost to efforts promoting cooperation, coordination, and 
mutual responsibility between these same whistleblowers and their 
respective companies.  In addition, legally excusing an employee’s failure 
to report potential violations to his or her employer effectively severs the 
employee’s preexisting financial interest in a paycheck from the success of 
the company’s internal compliance and reporting systems and converts this 
to a non-mutual self-interest. 
The SEC insists mandatory internal pre-reporting would not make any 
difference with respect to those whistleblowers who are already pre-
disposed to report internally.
239
  In addition, the SEC claims the bounty 
program will induce some individuals who, absent any financial incentive, 
would never have reported either internally or externally to the SEC in the 
first place.
240
  However, the SEC leaves the single, largest category of 
employees completely out of their analysis: those who report internally 
because it is in their mutual self-interest.  The SEC bounty program does 
much more than simply create a financial incentive to report potential 
violations to the SEC; it essentially changes the terms and conditions of 
employment.  It effectively prohibits employers from requiring that 
employees immediately report potential violations to the company as a 
condition of employment.  Employers are now legally forced to leave to 
the whistleblower the decision whether to report allegations internally.  
The SEC claims this as an additional “advantage” to its approach: 
[I]t allows whistleblowers to select the proper reporting 
procedures under the specific circumstances.  Whistleblowers 
can balance the potential increase in the probability and 
magnitude of an award by participating in an effective 
internal compliance mechanism, against the particular risks 
that may result from doing so, which could include 
retaliation, loss of anonymity (for those companies that may 
not have effective anonymous reporting procedures), delay 
due to an ineffective or questionable internal compliance 
                                                                                                                          
239 See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,360 (June 
13, 2011) (specifying that whistleblowers who report internally would receive a whistleblower award 
from the SEC with participation in an internal report framework counting as a “plus-factor”). 
240 Id. 
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mechanism, and destruction of evidence based on the nature 
of the allegations or the corporate environment.  On balance, 
we believe that, from a law-enforcement perspective, overall 
efficiency is better promoted by allowing whistleblowers to 
make this assessment on a case-by-case basis.
241
 
The SEC’s conclusion, however, assumes all financial incentives are 
equal, when they are not.  Some financial awards may promote cooperation 
between the employer and employee, while other incentives can hinder 
such cooperation.  Yet, despite the obvious benefits of employer-employee 
collaboration, the SEC was unwilling to take on the responsibility (and 
inherent political risks) of assessing whether a whistleblower should be 
required to cooperate with an employer’s internal reporting system.242  The 
SEC excused this willful neglect by claiming fact-intensive assessments 
would “divert limited resources from the [SEC’s] primary objective of 
investigating allegations of wrongdoing.”243 
Such an assessment, however, does not depend on fact-intensive 
empirical research; instead, it rests on the proper understanding of the basic 
good of community within corporations.  The true nature of corporations as 
communities is obscured by the fact that they are sometimes spoken of as a 
legal fiction or “system” and at other times referred to as persons with 
interests and rights.
244
  According to the legal philosopher John Finnis, 
however, a corporation is best understood as a “community of joint action” 
formed between, among others, an employer and its employees.
245
  Finnis 
uses a variety of synonyms to describe this “joint action,” including 
“collaboration, co-operation, and co-ordination.”246  He also includes in 
that same grouping what he calls “negative co-ordination,” by which he 
means “mutual non-interference,” such as abstaining from harming the 
other.
247
 
This coordination serves at least two of the most basic human goods.  
This is true even if the only reason an employee collaborates or cooperates 
with his or her employer is the business relationship.  Beyond the value of 
what he or she can get paid, for example, there is the value of “skillful 
                                                                                                                          
241 Id. at 34,361–62 & n.462. 
242 Id. at 34,361 (noting that the inability of the SEC to promptly respond to the necessity of 
individual whistleblowers to report internally would lead to the program being less cost-effective, and 
possibly less successful, given that it might reduce overall whistleblowing). 
243 Id. at 34,362. 
244 See FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 10, at 135 (arguing that since all groups are a matter of 
relationship and interaction, they should be defined as an ongoing state of affairs, or in the broadest 
sense, as a form of unifying relationship between human beings). 
245 Id. at 138. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
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performance, in work and play,” which Finnis identifies as a basic good.248  
An employee also values being a part of an “association between persons,” 
which Finnis refers to as the basic good of sociability or “community.”249  
The intrinsic value of these basic goods is self-evident and therefore, 
according to natural law scholars, known to all.
250
  Other scholars, in fact, 
who do not necessarily consider themselves a part of the recent 
revitalization of the natural law tradition, agree that community is a basic 
good.
251
  For example, the perfectionist liberal philosopher Joseph Raz 
holds that “living in a society” is intrinsically good.252  Even contemporary 
liberal theorists like Ronald Dworkin recognize the need to balance 
individual rights with individual responsibilities to the community because 
“[i]t is part of any proper conception of personal responsibility that people 
should make . . . choices . . . with an eye to the opportunity costs to others 
of the choices that they make.”253 
In addition, these perfectionist philosophers are not alone in defending 
the corporation as a community.  Like Finnis, a group of organizational 
management and corporate law scholars known as “corporate 
communitarians” also views the employer-employee relationship as one of 
collaboration.
254
  These corporate communitarians must be distinguished 
from political philosophy communitarians like Alasdair MacIntyre,
255
 
                                                                                                                          
248 John Finnis, Liberalism and Natural Law Theory, 45 MERCER L. REV. 687, 691–92 (1994). 
249 Id. at 691.  He also refers to the basic good of association between persons as “friendship.” Id. 
250 Adam J. MacLeod, Identifying Values in Land Use Regulation, 101 KY. L.J. (forthcoming 
2012) (explaining that intrinsic means “it is not contingent upon anything more basic than itself”). 
251 See, e.g., RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 9, at 199 (observing that living within a tolerant and 
educated society is beneficial to individuals); Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
469, 470 (2010) [hereinafter Dworkin, Justice] (arguing that through government people can 
collectively ensure their individual right to self-determination). 
252 RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 9, at 206. 
253 Dworkin, Justice, supra note 251, at 470; see also id. (“[P]eople should make such choices 
with a sense of the consequences.”). 
254 See Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholders and Corporate 
Law:  Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 395–96 (1993) (observing 
that the corporate communitarianism “seeks to undermine the law’s distinction between ‘public’ and 
‘private’ spheres of activity”); see also Jeffrey Bone, Legal Perspectives on Corporate Responsibility:  
Contractarian or Communitarian Thought?, 24 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 277, 278 (2011) (noting that 
“communitarians emphasize cooperation, justice, and civic responsibility”); Thomas C. Kohler, 
Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, 1993 BYU L. REV. 727, 728 (1993) (arguing against 
the individualism that leads us to “reject our character as social beings”); Millon, supra note 176, at 
1378–79 (observing that communitarians emphasize the broad social effects of corporate activity on 
non-shareholders over the narrow range of monetizable interests of those within the corporation). 
255 See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 5 (2d ed. 1984) (arguing that “the integral 
substance of morality has to a large degree been fragmented and then in part destroyed,” which has 
resulted in a lack of rational ways for our society to deal with moral problems).   Other leading political 
philosophy communitarians, such as Richard Rorty, Charles Taylor, and Michael Sandel, share 
MacIntyre’s anti-corporate views.  See, e.g., MICHAEL SANDEL, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY: ESSAYS ON 
MORALITY IN POLITICS 43 (2005) (arguing against large corporations because they are unaccountable 
to the communities they serve). 
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because the latter group reaches very different normative conclusions 
regarding corporations.
256
  Nevertheless, several legal and business 
scholars have used MacIntyre’s concepts of “practices” and “communities 
of purpose” for the basis of a framework of business ethics.257  In 
particular, corporate communitarians agree with perfectionist philosophers 
that the concept of the corporation as a community is essential to 
mitigating the errors of both individualism and collectivism inherent in 
many corporation laws and regulations.
258
  They see the corporation as 
more than simply a contractual arrangement between individuals.
259
  They 
seek to inject a sense of mutual responsibility into the discussion that 
seems too often defined by individual rights.
260
 
The primary difference between communitarians and perfectionists is 
their respective starting points for deliberations about the common good.  
As we have already noted, new natural law theorists, like Finnis, begin 
with a set of basic goods, which are deemed self-evident, from which they 
                                                                                                                          
256 Alasdair MacIntyre, Corporate Modernity and Moral Judgment: Are They Mutually 
Exclusive?, in ETHICS AND PROBLEMS OF THE 21ST CENTURY 122, 124 (K.E. Goodpaster & K.M. Sayre 
eds., 1979) (rejecting the idea of the corporation as a community, and asserting that the “modern 
corporation is an agency which by its moralizing splinters morality into dissociated parts”); see also 
Ron Beadle, The Misappropriation of MacIntyre, 2 REASON IN PRACTICE 45, 52–53 (2002) (reversing 
his position in an earlier work and concluding businesses are “neither practices nor communities of 
purpose”). 
257 See Kathryn Balstad Brewer, Management as a Practice: A Response to Alasdair MacIntyre, 
16 J. BUS. ETHICS 825, 829 (1997) (arguing that “management can be construed as a practice under 
MacIntyre’s definition” where “the manager operates within a socially established field”); Geoff 
Moore, On the Implications of the Practice Institution Distinction: MacIntyre and the Application of 
Modern Virtue Ethics to Business, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 19, 22–23 (2002) (arguing that a business is a 
practice); Richard Warren, The Empty Company: Morality and Job Security, 25 PERSONNEL REV., Apr. 
1996 (arguing corporations are a kind of incubator in which individuals can learn the worth of virtue); 
Ron Beadle, Virtue Ethics and Employment or the Case of the Cancelled Holiday 9–11 (Jan. 7, 1998) 
(unpublished paper, Kingston Bus. Sch.), available at http://northumbria.academia.edu/RonBeadle/Pap
ers/291898/Virtue_Ethics_and_ Employment_or_The_Case_of_the_Cancelled_Holiday (arguing that 
“employment is itself a practice”).  
258 See Daniel J. Ott, Process Communitarianism, 10 CONSCRESCENCE: AUSTRALASIAN J. 
PROCESS THOUGHT 67, 67 (2009), available at concrescence.org/index.php/ajpt/article/download/75/39 
(discussing “[t]he core conviction of [communitarianism]” which advocates the “the renewal and/or 
creation of human community” to “mitigate the errors of both individualism and collectivism” and “to 
correct ideologies that have led to destructive practices” (alteration in original)). 
259 Communitarianism is generally associated with themes of single constituency, Catholic social 
thought, and corporate citizenship. 
260 In the corporate context, communitarianism generally promotes the idea of corporate social 
responsibility.  It also tends to support unions and other self-organized mediating structures in the 
workplace.  See Kohler, supra note 254, at 740 (arguing mediating structures like unions help counter 
“formal individualism” in which individuals have become increasingly dependent on their employers 
and the state to regulate the order of the employment relationship); Alia McMullen, New Streams of 
Responsibility; A Company’s Social Work Should be Aligned with Its Business, FIN. POST, Mar. 23, 
2010, at FP8 (discussing some approaches of corporate social responsibility, such as cutting water use 
and promoting sustainable practices in the office).  
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can deduce and apply other common goods.
261
  Communitarians, on the 
other hand, begin by asking, “What is the common good?”  They maintain 
that “society should articulate what is good,” and they see their job as 
interpreting and refining those immanent values.
262
  Thus, 
communitarianism is best understood as the process by which the 
community deliberates about the common good rather than as a defined set 
of moral principles to be applied.
263
  
Under either theoretical construct, however, the whistleblower’s moral 
responsibility to cooperate in his or her corporate community is more than 
just a contractual obligation between an employee and an employer.  We 
each have the responsibility, as Finnis puts it,  to “do as one would be done 
by.”264  Corporate whistleblowers incur this responsibility by virtue of the 
employment relationship.  This relationship creates a “special frame of 
reference or vantage point” that gives each party a “special locus standi,” 
or “right to claim performance.”265  Even if a whistleblower is not working 
under a written employment contract, certain promises or responsibilities 
are derived from the employment relationship itself as an instrument of 
cooperation.  According to Finnis, the content of those responsibilities 
depends on: (1) the employee’s “own voluntary commitment[]” to being 
employed; (2) the employee’s “present receipt of benefits” from the 
employer; and (3) the dependence of others in the workplace on the 
employee as a result of “actual or potential interdependencies” existing 
between employees of a corporation.
266
  The responsibility to adhere to this 
tacit promise should be respected for the whistleblower’s own good, which 
is in turn overlapped by the common good.
267
  
All corporations and employees, including corporate whistleblowers, 
are motivated by the common good of mutual self-interest.
268
  
                                                                                                                          
261 See supra note 247. 
262 Amitai Etzioni, A Communitarian Approach: A Viewpoint on the Study of the Legal, Ethical 
and Policy Considerations Raised by DNA Tests and Databases, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS  214, 214 
(2006) (“Hence communitarians are interested in communities (and moral dialogues within them), 
historically transmitted values and mores, and the societal units that transmit and enforce group  
values . . . which are all parts of communities.”). 
263 See Michele Estrin Gilman, Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward a Community-Based 
Welfare System, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 733–34 (2005) (explaining communitarians view the 
community as the primary value in society and contend it is a mistake to strive for universal principles 
of justice).  
264 FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 10, at 304. 
265 Id. 
266 Id. at 175. 
267 See id. at 305 (discussing how “[t]he good of an individual party to . . . the promise . . . is part 
of the common good” because “[t]he common good is the good of individuals, living together and 
depending upon one another in ways that favour the well-being of each”). 
268 See id. (“[I]t is a truth of wide application that an individual acts most appropriately for the 
common good, not by trying to estimate the needs of the common good at large, but by performing his 
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Fundamentally, a company engages in any business activity, including 
legal compliance efforts, because it wants to make a profit and its 
employees participate in or support that activity because they want to earn 
a living.
269
  Over the last decade, researchers in the field of organizational 
behavior management have studied numerous samples of whistleblowers, 
using sound descriptive and empirical research methods.  Their findings 
provide an emerging picture of whistleblowers that is remarkably 
consistent with this fundamental idea.  For example, research has shown 
that most whistleblowers are not disgruntled employees; on the contrary, 
they identify with the company and are committed to its goals.
270
  Other 
research confirms that people are motivated to do what they believe 
benefits others, not just themselves.
271
   
This notion of a common interest or common pursuit between a 
company and its employees is critical to corporate compliance efforts 
generally.
272
  With a shared objective, both the employer and the employee 
will often look for best practices for solving their coordination problems 
and will recognize the authority of the person designated to select among 
available solutions.
273
  Although the particulars of a corporate compliance 
program can vary depending on the business of the organization, an 
integral part of any effective program is a consistent internal process for 
internally reporting potential violations. The corporate system operates 
most efficiently where corporate employees act cooperatively—and are 
perceived as doing so.  For example, most companies require as a 
condition of employment that their employees commit to helping monitor 
and report potential securities violations internally.
274
  In one recent survey, 
90% of respondents, including 99% of respondents from publicly traded 
                                                                                                                          
contractual undertakings, and fulfilling his other responsibilities, to ascertained individuals . . . to those 
who have particular rights correlative to his duties.”). 
269 See id. (discussing how “[f]ulfilling one’s particular obligations . . . is necessary if one is to 
respect and favour [sic] the common good”).   
270 Brewer & Selden, supra note 25, at 419; see also id. at 420 (concluding  that “[o]ur review of 
the literature did not uncover a single study published during the last decade that refutes the  
findings . . . outlined above”). 
271 STOUT, supra note 12, at 114–18. 
272 See, e.g., Comment from Watts, supra note 165, at 1 (“AT&T maintains mandatory ethical and 
Code of Conduct training programs for all employees, offers anonymous hotlines for the reporting of 
complaints or violations, and repeatedly emphasizes to its employees the need to foster an ethical and 
compliant business environment at all times.”). 
273 In most companies the internal audit or legal department is responsible for the internal 
compliance and reporting systems. 
274 See, e.g., Comment from Watts, supra note 165, at 2 (“AT&T believes that it is critical to any 
compliance program that an employee who is aware of potential misconduct, but who stands by 
silently, be barred from any aware or bounty . . . . [E]ach [employee] is also responsible for voice any 
compliance or ethical concerns.  Every company must rely on its employees not only to develop and 
implement new ideas but to do so ethically and in compliance with the company’s code of conduct.”). 
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companies, reported having employee hotlines in place.
275
  Those activities 
must be coordinated, either for the sake of the coordinated interaction itself 
or for some other shared objective.  A legal regime that promotes the views 
that the moral norm of cooperation is only instrumental, and thereby 
diminishes both the force of the norm and its internalization, would reduce 
the efficiency of the corporate compliance system.
276
 
Leading treatises on business ethics have also concluded that using 
internal before external channels is the only moral choice for a 
whistleblower, unless he or she reasonably expects that using the internal 
channel will result in retaliation against him or her.
277
  For example, 
Professor Bowie’s treatise, Business Ethics, warns the whistleblower to use 
internal channels first, if possible, and to act in accordance with his or her 
responsibilities for “avoiding and/or exposing moral violations.”278  It also 
includes the now famous dictum that the act of whistleblowing must stem 
from appropriate moral motives of preventing unnecessary harm to 
others.
279
  Yet, the SEC’s new bounty program actually incentivizes moral 
harm to employees by prompting them to act for merely instrumental 
reasons, at the unnecessary expense of mutual self-interest and 
cooperation. 
Since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, several commentators have 
suggested that one way for corporations to still achieve cooperation, 
without the SEC mandating internal reporting, is by the corporation 
creating counterincentives.
280
  However, the more effective it would be in 
                                                                                                                          
275 Impact of Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions: What Companies Are Doing!, SOC’Y CORP. 
COMPLIANCE & ETHICS (Sept. 15, 2011, 11:42 AM), http://www.corporatecompliance.org/Resources/
View/smid/940/ArticleID/329.aspx. 
276 See Eisenberg, supra note 153, at 1266, 1291 (arguing that “the social norm of loyalty that the 
legal rules support and define is critical to the efficient operation of the duty of loyalty” thus “[i]n the 
loyalty area, social norms increase efficiency”). 
277 See NORMAN E. BOWIE, BUSINESS ETHICS 144 (1982) (“Since the whistle blower does have an 
obligation of loyalty to his or her employer, he or she should—at least in normal circumstances—use 
the institutional mechanisms that have been created for the purpose of registering dissent with the 
polices or actions of the corporation.”); R.T. DE GEORGE, BUSINESS ETHICS 232–33 (2d. ed. 1986) 
(arguing that whistle blowing is only morally justifiable if the employee “exhaust[s] the internal 
procedures and possibilities within the firm” because “whistle blowing does harm to the firm, [and] 
harm in general is minimized if the firm is informed of the problem and allowed to correct it”). 
278 BOWIE, supra note 277, at 143; see  Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Whistle-Blowing: Myth 
and Reality, 22 J. MGMT. 507, 509 (1996) (“[O]rganizations being accused of wrongdoing would prefer 
that whistle-blowers use internal channels to report the wrongdoing rather than external . . . . Bowie . . . 
and other ethicists . . . have implied that this is the only moral action, unless the whistle-blower expects 
that this channel will result in retaliation against him or her.”). 
279 See BOWIE, supra note 277, at 143 (“The moral aim of whistle blowing is deemed so central 
that it is made part of the definition, namely, whistle blowing aims at exposing unnecessary harm, 
violation of human rights, or conduct counter to the defined purpose of the corporation.”). 
280 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,326 (June 13, 
2011); see also supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing how some corporations have already 
created countermeasures to increase the effectiveness of internal reporting of fraud). 
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countering a multi-million dollar bounty reward, the more expensive it 
would need to be.  In contrast, using the law itself to facilitate a corporate 
culture of cooperation by mandating internal reporting is relatively 
inexpensive. 
Despite all of the foregoing reasons to conclude otherwise, the SEC’s 
final rules reflect a much narrower conception of an employee’s reciprocal 
responsibilities to a corporation.  The SEC rules address some but not all 
aspects of the mutual responsibility between a whistleblower and his or her 
employer.  As discussed earlier, the SEC rules attempt to address causal 
responsibility.
281
  The rules also address what could be called supervisory 
or assignment responsibility.
282
  However, the current SEC rules do not 
address mutual responsibility.  As a consequence, the SEC’s new bounty 
program fails to recognize the importance of an employer and employee’s 
shared intention to cooperate via internal compliance and reporting 
systems.
283
   
If the only reason for not bypassing internal reporting is the prospect of 
a slight reduction in the bounty, then whistleblowers can be expected to 
regularly violate that duty.  If the violation is undetected, the whistleblower 
comes out ahead.  If it is detected, the whistleblower is still statistically 
better off with the slight deduction than he or she would have been if he or 
she had cooperated internally. While it is possible that the SEC might 
reduce the bounty to zero, these sanctions are not typical, and thus the 
prospect of such sanctions, discounted by the likelihood that they will be 
imposed, will be unlikely to change the picture that much.   
This not only undermines the usefulness of internal reporting systems, 
but it also undermines the common good of “individuals, living together 
and depending upon one another in ways that favour [sic] the well being of 
each . . . derived from basic requirements of practicable reasonableness.”284  
The corporate whistleblower who knows about a potential securities 
violation has a moral obligation to immediately report it to the company.  
This responsibility stems “from the sheer fact of ability to co-ordinate 
action for the common good.”285  This ability (or what Finnis elsewhere 
calls authority) “accrues . . . for the sake of the standing needs of the good 
of persons in community—from the sheer fact of power, of opportunity to 
affect, for good, the common life,”286 and the internal reporting system 
                                                                                                                          
281 See supra Part III.B. (discussing the eligibility exclusions for a whistleblower award).  
282 See id. (discussing the eligibility exclusions, as promulgated in the final rules). 
283 Internal compliance programs presuppose that employers and employees have a shared interest 
to cooperate with each other.  Thus, self-interest is not necessarily immoral.  I argue it is only non-
mutual self-interest that is wrong. 
284 FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 10, at 305.  Practicable reasonableness is the basic good 
that structures our pursuit of all the other basic human goods.  Id. at 100. 
285 Id. at 252. 
286 Id. at 275 (emphasis added). 
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represents just such a missed opportunity to affect.  In other words, by 
failing to respect the authority of his employer, a whistleblower who fails 
to report internally privileges his private gain over the common life of the 
corporation’s members, and all who depend on them. 
The SEC’s final rules leave it up to the employee to decide whether to 
take seriously this responsibility to report internally first.  Whether that 
duty exists, however, cannot turn on the internal attitude of the employee. 
Individual motivations will vary.  In addition, employees are not in the best 
position to decide whether to utilize an internal reporting system because 
they will be preoccupied with trying to convince the SEC to bring the 
enforcement action to worry about “the general needs of the common good 
which justify authority.”287 
The bounty program treats the corporate whistleblower like he or she 
was just some random third party who chooses to blow the whistle on a 
particular company.  The difference between a corporate whistleblower 
and other whistleblowers, however, is that a corporate whistleblower is an 
employee of the company, and his or her purpose for being there is to work 
for the company: to increase its profits, or to earn his or her wages, or both.  
Therefore, the corporate whistleblower must be willing to change his or her 
conduct to meet the shared business goals of his or her employer.  In 
contrast, an independent whistleblower’s purposes may or may not be 
coordinated with the company’s, but they are not shared.  At best, they are 
what Finnis calls “tangential or coincidental aims.”288  If a corporate 
whistleblower conspires with a third party to harm the corporation, then he 
or she has undermined the employer-employee relationship, even if only 
temporarily.  Likewise, a corporate whistleblower can work as an 
informant with the SEC without undermining his or her relationship with 
their company only if the corporate whistleblower exhausts internal report 
channels first, where possible.
289
  
Ultimately, a corporate whistleblower who bypasses a company’s 
internal compliance system is acting irresponsibly with regard to his or her 
corporate community despite the fact that the SEC’s final rules declare it to 
be legal.
290
  A whistleblower-employee who uses legally recognized 
authority to “promote [selfish] schemes thoroughly opposed to practical 
reasonableness cannot then reasonably claim to have discharged his own 
                                                                                                                          
287 Id. at 249. 
288 Id. at 152. 
289 Under the principle of double effect, any harm that the employee’s action causes to the 
corporate community is not morally culpable as long as the harm was an unintended, secondary 
consequence of the employee’s action.   
290 See FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 10, at 246 (“The fact that the say-so of a particular 
person or body or configuration of persons will in fact be, by and large, complied with and acted upon, 
has normative consequences of practical reasonableness; it affects the responsibilities of both ruler and 
ruled by creating certain exclusionary reasons for action.”). 
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responsibilities in reason.”291  Bypassing an internal complaint process to 
maximize the potential for a large bounty denies the corporate community 
the opportunity to correct wrongful conduct in its midst, and is thus 
inconsistent with the common good of mutual self-interest.
292
 
B.  The Communitarian Principle of Subsidiarity 
A second, equally important structural principle for making 
whistleblowing moral is the notion of subsidiarity.  This principle creates a 
presumption in favor of solving compliance problems at the corporate 
level, or even sub-corporate level, rather than immediately escalating the 
problem to the higher level of a federal government agency.  Even 
assuming the basic good of community, and the importance of cooperation, 
a corporate whistleblower must still sometimes choose between 
cooperating with the company and cooperating with the SEC.  As 
demonstrated below, the principle of subsidiarity can help whistleblowers 
mediate between these two conflicting roles in a way that maintains the 
morality of whistleblowing.   
The bounty program, as currently implemented, attempts to reduce the 
issue of sequencing to a strictly rational economic analysis.  By not 
mandating any particular sequence, the SEC leaves the decision entirely up 
to the individual whistleblower; the SEC’s only apparent expectation is 
that the whistleblower will choose the path that best maximizes the amount 
of any monetary reward. 
However, the sequence itself has far-reaching moral implications.  
Historically, the conflict between a whistleblower’s citizenship duties and 
his or her corporate citizenship duties has proven to be a significant source 
of moral tension.
293
  According to the SEC, the issue received more focus 
during the notice of proposed rulemaking for the new bounty program 
process than the role of internal compliance programs.
294
  Many of those 
comments implicitly raise not only prudential, but also normative concerns 
about permitting whistleblowers to bypass internal reporting channels in 
direct contravention to the principal of subsidiarity.
295
  
The subsidiarity principle states that “each social and political group 
should help smaller or more local [forms of human association] accomplish 
their respective ends without, however, arrogating those tasks to itself.”296  
In the corporate compliance context, it means looking first to employees to 
                                                                                                                          
291 Id. 
292 Id. 
293 Lobel, supra note 18, at 438. 
294 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300 (June 13, 2011). 
295 Id. at 34,361. 
296 Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 
97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 38 n.1 (2003).  
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police themselves, then to companies, and only then to state and federal 
agencies.
297
  The idea is that a society is “more just and more functional if 
the work that can be done by the parts is done by the parts, rather than 
being taken over by the whole.”298   
Like the principle of mutual self-interest, subsidiarity is rooted in a 
natural law understanding of the common good as a totality of the 
conditions necessary for a full and flourishing human life.
299
  Proponents of 
subsidiarity maintain that the ultimate purpose of the government, the 
corporation and all other mega structures is to serve human flourishing.
300
  
They further maintain this goal is best achieved by the organization that is 
closest to the individual because of the reflexive strategy inherent in the 
modern regulatory approach to corporate compliance known as “enforced 
self-regulation.”301  The goal of enforced self-regulation should be to 
structure corporations to make them “sensitive to the outside effects of 
their attempts to maximize internal rationality.”302  Consequently, they tend 
to favor smaller and more local forms of human associations, like the 
family, churches, and corporations, which presumably can act more 
efficaciously in individual lives than the federal government.
303
 
Historically, the idea of subsidiarity can be traced back to classical 
Greece and was later embraced by Aquinas.
304
  It can also be found in the 
writings of Montesquieu, Locke, Tocqueville
305
 and others who helped 
shaped the Founding Fathers’ understanding of federalism here in the 
United States.
306
  The Republican G.O.P. has often portrayed its 
                                                                                                                          
297 Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND. L. 
REV. 103, 104 (2001).  In the social context that means always look first to families to help their own, 
then to churches, neighborhood associations, civic groups, and other community organizations.  Id. 
298 Fred Crosson, Catholic Social Teaching and American Society, in PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC 
SOCIAL TEACHING 165, 170–71 (David A. Boileau ed., 1998). 
299 Carozza, supra note 296, at 43. 
300 Id. 
301 IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE 106 (1992) (proposing institutional changes in regulatory structures based on 
reflexivity); see also Carozza, supra note 296, at 43 (explaining the liner and organic structure of 
various human associations and that larger groups are understood to serve the individual). 
302 Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
239, 278 (1983).  
303 Several scholars have noted that some corporations, depending on their size and hierarchy, can 
be just as problematic as governments.  See Vischer, supra note 297, at 129 (stating “the corporation is 
a money-generating enterprise, not a means for furthering subsidiarity’s objectives”). 
304 Carozza, supra note 296, at 40–41. 
305 See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513 (J.P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans., 1988) (“[A]t the head of any new undertaking, where in France you would find the 
government or in England some territorial magnate, in the United States you are sure to find an 
association.”). 
306 David P. Currie, Subsidiarity, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 359, 363 (1998).  But see George A. Bermann, 
Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 332, 404 (1994) (“[A]lthough federalism conveys a 
general sense of a vertical distribution, or balance, of power, it is not generally understood as 
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compassionate conservatism as synonymous with subsidiarity.
307
 More 
recently, the term subsidiarity reemerged as one of the central 
constitutional principles (organizing principles) of the European Union.
308
 
As a political theory, critics have claimed “that subsidiarity is ‘weak, 
subjective, and open-ended.’”309  The fact that advocates at both ends of 
the political spectrum have employed the principle seemingly supports that 
claim.  However, subsidiarity is not simply an abstract principle of 
governance, rather it is a practical framework for solving real problems.  In 
the workplace, subsidiarity has proven particularly useful in imposing both 
limitations and affirmative duties on employers and employees.  For 
example, Pope Leo XIII, and later Pope Pius XI, used the principle to help 
forge a middle ground between the extremes of laissez-faire capitalism and 
Marxist socialism in order to advocate better working conditions and 
collective bargaining rights for workers in the nineteenth century.
310
 
In the context of corporate whistleblowing, subsidiarity is best 
understood as occupying a middle ground between the traditional 
command-and-control model, on the one hand, and the pure self-regulation 
model on the other.  Under the traditional command-and-control model, 
reliance on corporate codes of conduct, internal reporting systems and 
other forms of self-regulation is a weakness to be overcome by 
substantially increasing the size and capacity of the SEC.  Under a pure 
self-regulation model, however, recent efforts to bolster public 
enforcement efforts are further proof that a top-down regulatory approach 
will not and cannot reduce the level of corporate fraud and corruption.  
Subsidiarity, on the other hand, makes complete sense of both aspects of 
enforced self-regulation.  Subsidiarity accounts for the discretion afforded 
to prosecutors and corporations as well as the relationship between internal 
and external whistleblowing.  It does so by recognizing the capacity and 
responsibility of corporations with respect to compliance issues, and 
treating regulatory enforcement as properly supplemental or “subsidiary.”   
                                                                                                                          
expressing a preference for any particular distribution of that power. . . . [F]ederalism and subsidiarity, 
though of course closely related, are quite different.”). 
307 See Rick Santorum, A Compassionate Conservative Agenda: Addressing Poverty for the Next 
Millennium, 26 J. LEGIS. 93, 94 (2000) (explaining that the “‘compassionate conservative’ approach 
recognizes that government must work as a ‘silent partner,’ enabling communities, organizations and 
individuals to be innovative in rescuing those for whom American prosperity is so elusive”); see also 
MICHAEL NOVAK, ON CULTIVATING LIBERTY 97 (Brian C. Anderson ed., 1999) (concluding that the 
modern administrative state exists because “the principle of subsidiarity is continually violated”). 
308 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 (formally 
recognizing in the preamble subsidiarity as one of the principles governing fundamental rights); 
Vischer, supra note 297, at 121.  Although it appeared in debates on EC reform as early as 1975, the 
use of subsidiarity “culminated with the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, in which ‘the subsidiarity principle 
was proclaimed a guideline for further European integration.’”  Id. 
309 Vischer, supra note 297, at 121.   
310 Carozza, supra note 296, at 41–42. 
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Subsidiarity creates somewhat of a paradox as applied to 
whistleblowers.  It is able to simultaneously explain the need for internal 
reporting systems and the dangers of mandatory internal reporting.  
Subsidiarity suggests both a positive and a negative vision of the role of 
the whistleblower with respect to government and the corporation.
311
  As 
demonstrated below, this duality mandates that whistleblowers avail 
themselves of effective internal reporting procedures.  Where the 
corporation fails to establish or follow an internal compliance program, 
however, the whistleblower is equally justified by subsidiarity in 
cooperating directly with the regulatory authorities.  These two 
complimentary dimensions are generally referred to as “negative 
subsidiarity” and “positive subsidiarity.”   
1.  Negative Subsidiarity 
Negative subsidiarity generally emphasizes the limits of government 
intervention in business.
312
 As such, it expresses “a principle of non-
interference of the state in the rights of the individual or . . . in the smaller 
communities, namely where the individual or the small community is 
capable to fulfill its tasks itself.”313  This limitation is derived, in turn, from 
the proposition that the government, as one of the largest groupings in a 
democratic society, does not exist for its own sake.  Instead, government 
exists to provide individuals and smaller communities like corporations 
with the conditions enabling them to realize their own dignity or worth by 
freely choosing good ends, and instantiating them by just and proper 
means. To this end, negative subsidiarity denies the false dichotomy 
between individualism and collectivism. It requires respect for both 
individual rights and corporate rights because both are understood to be 
incorporated into a broader common good.  Respect for corporate rights 
does not become counterproductive or unnecessary, but it is placed in an 
integral relationship with individual rights to establish an internal 
compliance culture for the benefit of the whistleblower.  
To achieve this integration of corporate and individual rights, negative 
subsidiarity first recognizes the inherent dignity and value of every 
whistleblower.
314
  As an individual human being, the whistleblower “is 
ontologically and morally prior” to the SEC or any other agency of the 
government.
315
  Therefore, the SEC ought to be understood as serving the 
                                                                                                                          
311 Ken Endo, The Principle of Subsidiarity: From Johannes Althsuius to Jacques Delors, 44 
HOKKAIDO L. REV. 2064, 2054 (1994). 
312 See J. Verstraeten, Solidarity and Subsidiarity, in PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL 
TEACHING, supra note 298, at 135. 
313 Id. 
314 Endo, supra note 311, at 2029.  
315 Carozza, supra note 296, at 42. 
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whistleblower, not vise versa.  Under this approach, the value of the 
individual whistleblower is not derived from a purely utilitarian concern 
for regulatory efficiency.  A whistleblower is more than just a potential 
informant; a whistleblower is an employee who seeks to better him or her 
self through work and other forms of cooperative activity.  Work, as part of 
the basic human good of “excellence in play and work,” enables an 
individual to flourish as a human being.
316
  If a whistleblower’s human 
dignity is served through work and not just by the act of whistleblowing 
itself, then external whistleblowing must be done in such a way that 
satisfies the conditions necessary to accomplish human dignity and not just 
the successful prosecution of a corrupt corporation.  
Of course, the SEC would likely argue that they uphold the human 
dignity of whistleblowers by respecting individual autonomy and 
encouraging but not requiring internal reporting.  In reality, however, the 
bounty program abandons individuals to themselves (or to the arbitrary 
power of selfish greed and opportunism).  Under the bounty program, 
whistleblowers are not empowered to do the right thing; it makes no moral 
demands on whistleblowers at all.  Instead, it judges their worth solely by 
the quality of their tips that, in turn, are judged by whether or not the 
information they provide leads to an increase in the number of successful 
prosecutions.  Ultimately, there is nothing about this mere instrumentality 
approach that suggests it is reasonably calculated to serve human 
flourishing.  Instead it seems more likely to reduce whistleblowers to being 
mere agents of the SEC. 
At the same time, respect for the dignity and value of whistleblowers 
cannot be separated from respect for the corporate community, which 
includes first and foremost respect for the employer-employee relationship.  
In the case of the bounty program, this means respecting the autonomy and 
self-sufficiency of the corporation in carrying out its own internal 
compliance programs.  This is not simply because a good corporate 
compliance program depends for its success on the corporation and its 
employees working together.  Rather, it is because subsidiarity 
presupposes a substantive purpose and function for all corporations, “a 
common good” that is not inconsistent with making a profit and “that is 
ultimately directed toward the dignity of socially oriented human 
beings.”317  Although many have attempted to do so, it is no answer to 
argue that the modern corporation no longer has the common good as its 
purpose or end.  The dignity and value of whistleblowers, like any 
individual, “requires relationship with others” in a community and 
                                                                                                                          
316 MARK C. MURPHY, NATURAL LAW AND PRACTICAL RATIONALITY 96 (2001). 
317 Carozza, supra note 296, at 68.  
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corporations are inevitably members of those communities.
318
  As such, 
corporations contribute to the conditions necessary for individual dignity 
and human flourishing whether that is their stated purpose or not.
319
   
Moreover, it is through their involvement in the internal compliance 
process that whistleblowers can take part in applying law and morality to 
their daily lives.  Internal reporting systems contribute to that end in ways 
which the SEC’s bounty program is ill suited; namely, internal reporting 
simultaneously facilitates an individual’s pursuit of work and 
association.
320
  Employees realize their value as human beings in part by 
cooperating with their employers as members of that corporate community, 
rather than just cooperating with a government agency.
321
   
If corporations have value in providing individual employees with the 
conditions to flourish, then negative subsidiarity obligates whistleblowers 
to act at the lower level of the corporation first, and to work with the SEC 
to do only what the corporation is unable or unwilling to do with the 
whistleblower on its own.  Since each level of society is responsible for 
helping the “lower” one freely to accomplish its aims, it would undermine 
the principle of subsidiarity for a whistleblower to opt to work with the 
“higher” public authorities if he or she could have effectively worked with 
some internal corporate group that is closer to the individual.  According to 
Professor Moberly, this harmonizes well with an employee’s sense of 
loyalty to his or her employer.
322
 
Therefore, the SEC should amend the rules to mandate internal 
whistleblowing as a condition of being eligible for a bounty.  Clearly, any 
whistleblower program that seeks to divert every complaint or report to the 
                                                                                                                          
318 Id. at 42–43.  Some scholars are reluctant to recognize corporations, especially large 
corporations, as mediating structures.  See, e.g., Timothy L. Fort & James J. Noone, Banded Contracts, 
Mediating Institutions, and Corporate Governance: A Naturalist Analysis of Contractual Theories of 
the Firm, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 163, 197 (1999) (expressing a belief that corporations currently 
lack and need to embrace mediating institutions).  This is a subject I want to more fully explore in a 
future article about corporate personhood. 
319 That said, this social dimension to corporations does arguably obligate shareholders, directors 
and even employees to consider the common good in the use of corporate resources; however, this 
obligation is beyond the scope of this Article.  See Oliver F. Williams, Catholic Social Teaching: A 
Communitarian Democratic Capitalism for the New World Order, in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND 
THE NEW WORLD ORDER 5, 11 (Oliver F. Williams & John W. Houck eds., 1993) (stating this social 
dimension requires consideration of the common good in which Williams describes throughout the 
article as including respect for person and the social well-being of the group itself, which requires food, 
clothes, health, work, education, culture, knowledge, family, etc., as well as peace and order). 
320 Cynthia Estlund argues that the workplace is a crucial site for the boring of personal ties across 
lines that often divide people through mediating between individual citizens and the broader diverse 
citizenry.  See Estlund, supra note 178, at 324 (arguing that changes in employment law and greater 
self-enforcement is an opportunity to revive employees’ voices inside firms and reassert self-
monitoring).  
321 This is why negative subsidiarity generally favors the free market over centralized 
government. 
322 Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model, supra note 71, at 1142–43. 
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“higher” level of the government is incompatible with the basic 
presumptions of subsidiarity.  Such regulatory overreaching seriously 
undermines the corporation as a lower form of voluntary association.  To 
put it in classical subsidiarity terms, mandatory internal whistleblowing 
(with certain narrow exceptions) is the minimum that is necessary to 
ensure that whistleblowers operate within the boundaries of subsidiarity 
and that the SEC does not absorb the whistleblowers or “destroy” 
whistleblowing as a moral institution.
323
   
The SEC’s new bounty program borrowed heavily from the 
whistleblower provisions of the False Claims Act (“FCA”),324 and the SEC 
points to empirical studies of the FCA as evidence that whistleblowers will 
not be diverted from reporting internally by their new bounty program.
325
  
One empirical study found that “the overwhelming majority of employees 
voluntarily utilized internal reporting processes, despite the fact that they 
were potentially eligible for a large reward under the FCA.”326  The FCA, 
however, actually supports the counter argument because, until recently, 
several courts read the FCA to require “employer notice” of a qui tam suit 
in order to be eligible for an award.
327
  Prior to the 2009 amendments to the 
FCA, the statute did not clearly include within the term “protected activity” 
any activity conducted prior to filing the qui tam suit; therefore, some 
courts relied on the common law understanding of the fiduciary nature of 
the employer-employee relationship to infer a duty under the FCA to tell 
the whistleblower’s employer that he or she planned to file a qui tam 
action.
328
  Although Congress amended the FCA in 2009 to broaden the 
                                                                                                                          
323 Carozza, supra note 296, at 44. Equally irreconcilable, however, is a system that would 
mandate internal reporting at the “lower” corporate level even in the absence of any effective internal 
compliance program or where the complaint would be otherwise futile.  This would inevitably do 
violence to the dignity of the individual whistleblower.  This point is made clear in the discussion of 
positive subsidiarity. 
324 See Baruch & Barr, supra note 104, at 28–29. 
325 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,359 n.452 (June 
13, 2011). 
326 See Comment from Steven Kohn, Nat’l Whistleblowers Ctr. 4 (Dec. 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-212.pdf.  This study claims that “89.7% of employees 
who would eventually file a qui tam case initially reported their concerns internally, either to 
supervisors or compliance departments.” Id.  Another study of qui tam cases involving pharmaceutical 
companies showed “[n]early all (18 of 22) insiders first tried to fix matters internally by talking to their 
superiors, filing an internal complaint, or both” despite the fact that the ultimate monetary awards from 
external reporting were large, ranging from $100,000 to $42 million, with a median of $3 million. 
Kesselheim et al., supra note 149, at 1834. 
327 See Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948, 952 (5th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 
513 U.S. 1154 (1995); United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 
944 (6th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 1077 (1998) (treating the notice element as giving the 
employer “reason to believe that the employee was contemplating a qui tam action” (quoting Mikes v. 
Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d sub nom. United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, 
274 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
328 See Robertson, 32 F.3d at 951–52. 
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language in question,
329
 and thereby eliminate any remaining statutory 
ambiguity, this does not disprove the logic of the courts’ common sense 
reasoning for filling in the gaps prior to the amendment with an internal 
reporting requirement. 
Currently, there is legislation pending before the 112th Congress that 
would impose a similar requirement on the SEC’s new bounty program.  
On July 11, 2011, Congressman Michael Grimm (R-NY) introduced the 
Whistleblower Improvement Act of 2011, which would, among other 
things, require internal reporting as a condition for money benefits.
330
  The 
bill exempts a whistleblower from this requirement if internal reporting is 
not a “viable option” as evidenced by either (1) upper management 
committing or being involved in the alleged misconduct, or (2) “other 
evidence of bad faith on the part of the employer.”331  In December 2011, 
the bill passed through the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises and could be considered at any time by 
the full House Financial Services Committee.
332 
 While it faces stiff 
opposition by whistleblower advocacy groups, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce is partnering with corporations like AT&T and UPS to lend 
their full support for the bill.
 333
  
2.  Positive Subsidiarity 
The second component of subsidiarity answers the question, “What are 
the ‘narrow exceptions,’ if any, to the rule against external 
whistleblowing?”  Positive subsidiarity “involves the state intervening . . . 
to secure the goods of the partial community, but only so long as the partial 
community is incapable of achieving its ends.”334  It also includes “the help 
which the individual or the small community may expect from the larger 
community, but only when it is no longer capable of fulfilling its tasks 
itself.”335  In other words, subsidiarity does not automatically lead to the 
                                                                                                                          
329 Peter B. Hutt et al., 2009 Amendments to False Claims Act Pose New Challenges to Health 
Care Industry, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP (June 2, 2009),  
http://www.akingump.com/communicationcenter/newsalertdetail.aspx?pub=2163. 
330 The Whistleblower Improvement Act of 2011, H.R. 2483, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011). 
331 Id. § 2. The bill is modeled after the United Kingdom’s whistleblower law, which requires 
internal reporting to obtain anti-retaliation protection.  Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al., Whistleblowing: 
Australian, U.K., and U.S. Approaches to Disclosure in the Public Interest, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 879, 890 
(2004). 
332 Dana Liebelson, New Bill to Weaken Protections, Incentives for Whistleblowers Sneak 
Through Committee, TRUTHOUT (Feb. 16, 2012 8:04 AM), http://truth-
out.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=6721:new-bill-to-weaken-protections-incentives-
for-whistleblowers-sneaks-through-committee.  
333 Andrew Joseph, Whistleblower Bill Draws Lobbying, GOV’T EXEC. (Jan. 10, 2012), 
http://www.govexec.com/oversight/2012/01/whistleblower-bill-draws-lobbying/35798/.  
334 Crosson, supra note 298, at 170–71. 
335 Verstraeten, supra note 312, at 135. 
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devolution of functions from the federal government to the corporation, as 
some have suggested.
336
  On the contrary, the positive dimension of 
subsidiarity implies that the government has both the responsibility and 
authority to promote human flourishing and the common good; therefore, it 
has the right and duty to intervene in the economic sphere to foster justice. 
For the whistleblower, this means there are legitimate situations in 
which a whistleblower may cooperate with the SEC to realize 
subsidiarity’s ultimate objectives.  Namely, the corporate whistleblower is 
justified in escalating his or her concerns to the SEC in situations where 
the corporation cannot, or will not, take appropriate action by themselves.  
If the corporation has failed to protect the human dignity and value of the 
whistleblower, for example, then positive subsidiarity supports regulatory 
intervention.  The most obvious examples of this includes a corrupt 
company that retaliates against an employee for refusing to cooperate with 
unlawful activity, or that responds to an internal report by covering up the 
violation.  Such conduct, when ratified by the company, inevitably 
compromises human dignity.  A whistleblower certainly has the moral 
authority or duty in such instances, to escalate the problem to a “higher” 
level—such as the federal government—“to promote and protect the 
human dignity.”337   
In fact, positive subsidiarity insists not only that the whistleblower may 
cooperate with prosecutors in such situations, but that the whistleblower 
has a duty to exercise his or her “inherent right” to concern itself with the 
common good.
338
  This suggests whistleblowers ought to be increasingly 
treated as “gatekeepers.”  Although unheard of thirty years ago, the value 
of gatekeepers is now widely accepted.
339
  Still, only a few categories of 
employees are compelled to blow the whistle on corporate malfeasance 
under existing law.
340
  Positive subsidiarity suggests, however, that every 
                                                                                                                          
336 But see Marshall J. Breger, Government Accountability in the Twenty-First Century, 57 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 423, 430 (1996) (“The principle of devolution, often called subsidiarity in the European 
Union context, is based on the notion that decisions made closest to those affected are likely to be the 
best informed and certainly the most democratically based.” (footnote omitted)); A. Michael Froomkin, 
Of Governments and Governance, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 617, 621 n.8 (1999) (“Subsidiarity is the 
devolution of responsibility to smaller political units in the context of a federal system.”). 
337 Vischer, supra note 297, at 115; see also Damon Linker, John Paul II, Intellectual, 103 POL’Y 
REV. 12, 12 (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6912. 
338 See Carozza, supra note 296, at 44. 
339 Today the Business Roundtable issues statements on corporate governance supporting the role 
of gatekeepers.  Companies that do not have robust internal reporting systems are subjected to severe 
criticisms by institutional investors and publicly derided.  See Letter from Alexander Cutler, CEO of 
Business Roundtable, to Reps. Scott Garret & Maxine Waters, U.S. Congress (Dec. 23, 2011), 
available at http://http://businessroundtable.org/news-center/brt-letter-to-chairman-garrett-and-
representative-waters-on-whistleblo/ (endorsing the Whistleblower Improvement Act and noting that 
internal compliance systems remain a defense against unethical behavior). 
340 For example, SOX requires principal executive and financial officers to personally certify 
financial statements, including significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in controls and 
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employee should be mandated to report potential securities violations.   
That said, mandatory whistleblowing would be problematic under the 
current bounty program because mandatory whistleblowers are not 
currently eligible for a bounty.  One solution would be to permit all 
categories of employees to be eligible for a bounty.  If internal reporting 
were mandatory for all employees, it would no longer make sense to 
disqualify one employee but not another.  Instead, all employees would be 
subject to the bounty program’s existing exhaustion requirement, or a 
modified version of it, consistent with the principle of subsidiarity. 
Positive subsidiarity also suggests certain definite responsibilities for 
corporations.  First of all, corporations must have good, effective 
compliance programs.  Much of the opposition to mandating internal 
reporting was based on the fear that internal reporting systems were 
ineffectual or, worse yet, a sham.
341
  If corporations are not held to their 
responsibility to the community, this will inevitably foster a corporate 
culture of lax enforcement and increasing insensitivity to human dignity.
342
   
H.R. 2483 seeks to accomplish this goal as well.  The bill would 
require an employer to have a policy prohibiting retaliation.
343
  In addition, 
the employer’s internal reporting system must allow for anonymous 
reporting.
344
  Both of these institutional design conditions on employers 
would help drive collaborative processes and overcome non-mutual self-
interest on the part of either the employer or the employee.  Alternatively, 
Congress could create an affirmative defense, but only for certain types of 
securities law violations, such as securities fraud or foreign bribery.
345
  
Sen. Christopher Coons (D-DE) has publicly endorsed the idea of 
amending the FCPA, for example, to create a compliance defense for 
violations of that Act.
346
 
Finally, positive subsidiarity means corporations should take a more 
multi-layered approach to corporate compliance, recognizing there are a 
                                                                                                                          
procedures.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006)).  
In addition to establishing a robust oversight role for independent auditors and the board’s audit 
committee, SOX also contains an “up-the-ladder” reporting requirement which encourages corporate 
counsel to disclose under certain circumstances information related to material violations of securities 
law to the SEC.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 116 Stat. 784 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245); 17 
C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2011). 
341 Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra note 15, at 109. 
342 Williams, supra note 319, at 18. 
343 The Whistleblower Improvement Act of 2011, H.R. 2483, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(2)(D) (2011). 
344 Id. 
345 At least one firm, however, is advising clients that information regarding foreign bribery is not 
eligible for whistleblower bounty in the first place.  See Larry P. Ellsworth, No Whistleblower Bounties 
for FCPA Tips on Private Companies, JENNER & BLOCK (Sept. 28, 2011), 
http://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/2962/original/No_Whistleblower_Bounties_for_FCPA_Ti
ps_on_Private_Companies.pdf?1319642124. 
346 Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a New Era, 
43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 140 (2011). 
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variety of mediating structures between the whistleblower and the 
corporation.
347
  Since no compliance program is perfect, it is essential that 
companies construct a safety net of overlapping monitoring and reporting 
systems.
348
  This is true both at the sub-corporate level, where individual 
departments, ombudsmen and third-party hotlines play a critical role in 
compliance, and at the supra corporate level, where industry/trade 
associations, self-regulating organizations and the cooperation of various 
stakeholders in the proposed rulemaking process help the SEC to realize 
universal compliance norms and best practices.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
A good corporate compliance program depends for its success on the 
corporation and its employees working together for their mutual benefit.  
However, the SEC’s new bounty program undermines this collaborative or 
cooperative arrangement by promoting the employee’s non-mutual interest 
in a bounty.  In addition, the SEC’s “employee knows best” approach 
undermines the supremacy of internal over external whistleblowing as a 
problem-solving mechanism.  Instead, the SEC should extend the 
mandatory internal reporting requirement to all corporate whistleblowers 
rather than just a few select categories of employees.  This approach could 
be developed by the courts through litigation or independently by the SEC 
through further rulemaking.  Alternatively, Congress could pass H.R. 2483, 
which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services on December 
14, 2011, to bring the Dodd-Frank Act more in line with this approach. 
This across-the-board approach to mandating internal whistleblowing 
would have three primary benefits.  First, it would address the problem of 
bad companies that are not compliant with the laws by making the internal 
reporting requirement contingent on the employer having an effective 
complaint process in the first instance.  Second, it would reduce  
over-reporting due to the inherent indeterminacy of badly drafted securities 
laws and regulations, especially anti-corruption and anti-fraud laws.  
Finally, it would address the growing integrity problem of bad employees 
                                                                                                                          
347 Although beyond the scope of this Article, subsidiarity also suggests there are multiple layers 
of collaboration between the corporation and the government.  This subject is more fully explored in 
the field of New Governance.  Scholars in this field such as Professors Cindy L. Estlund and Orly 
Lobel advocate more dynamic, adaptive policy techniques to structure cooperative interactions between 
agencies, industries and other stakeholders to increase both the efficiency add legitimacy of regulations 
in areas such as occupational safety, environmental protection and, of course, securities law.  Estlund, 
supra note 178, at 325; Lobel, supra note 18, at 434. 
348 See Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 40 (Aug. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/barbara_black/2/ (“An SEC rule that would impose a monitoring duty on both 
broker-dealers and investment advisers would be a significant improvement in investor protection and 
consistent with the modern reality.”). 
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by providing the corporate whistleblower with the added benefit of 
knowing that he or she did everything reasonably possible internally before 
escalating the matter to the SEC.   
In many ways, whistleblowers are the consciences of the corporations 
they serve.  The failure of the SEC’s new whistleblower bounty program to 
promote the common good of community within corporations risks 
returning corporate America to the days when employees who ratted on 
their employers were considered morally repugnant and disloyal due to 
their insider status.  After all, a rich rat is still a rat.  Instead, the efforts of 
“real” whistleblowers, who do what they do because they expect their 
cooperation to benefit others, ought to be protected, and when they are 
retaliated against, they ought to be fully restored to their rightful positions, 
rather than supplanting them with the devious stratagems of bounty 
hunters.  What corporate whistleblowers really need in order to do the right 
thing is not more radical incentives, but radical justice.  Providing a 
comprehensive whistleblower compensation fund, a topic I hope to explore 
more fully in my next article, may be the final missing piece to the solution 
for making corporate whistleblowing moral.   
